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ABSTRACT
Power System Fault Analysis Based on Intelligent Techniques and Intelligent
Electronic Device Data. (May 2007)
Xu Luo, B.S., Xi’an Jiaotong University;
M.S., Xi’an Jiaotong University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Mladen Kezunovic
This dissertation has focused on automated power system fault analysis. New
contributions to fault section estimation, protection system performance evaluation
and power system/protection system interactive simulation have been achieved. In-
telligent techniques including expert systems, fuzzy logic and Petri-nets, as well as
data from remote terminal units (RTUs) of supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) systems, and digital protective relays have been explored and utilized to
fufill the objectives.
The task of fault section estimation is difficult when multiple faults, failures
of protection devices, and false data are involved. A Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-nets
approach has been proposed to tackle the complexities. In this approach, the fuzzy
reasoning starting from protection system status data and ending with estimation of
faulted power system section is formulated by Petri-nets. The reasoning process is
implemented by matrix operations. Data from RTUs of SCADA systems and digital
protective relays are used as inputs. Experiential tests have shown that the proposed
approach is able to perform accurate fault section estimation under complex scenarios.
The evaluation of protection system performance involves issues of data acqui-
sition, prediction of expected operations, identification of unexpected operations and
diagnosis of the reasons for unexpected operations. An automated protection sys-
tem performance evaluation application has been developed to accomplish all the
iv
tasks. The application automatically retrieves relay files, processes relay file data,
and performs rule-based analysis. Forward chaining reasoning is used for prediction
of expected protection operation while backward chaining reasoning is used for diag-
nosis of unexpected protection operations. Lab tests have shown that the developed
application has successfully performed relay performance analysis.
The challenge of power system/protection system interactive simulation lies in
modeling of sophisticated protection systems and interfacing the protection system
model and power system network model seamlessly. An approach which utilizes the
“compiled foreign model” mechanism of ATPMODELS language is proposed to model
multifunctional digital protective relays in C++ language and seamlessly interface
them to the power system network model. The developed simulation environment
has been successfully used for the studies of fault section estimation and protection
system performance evaluation.
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vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am sincerely grateful to my advisor Dr. Mladen Kezunovic for his advice, sup-
port and patience, which made this dissertation possible. During my study at Texas
A&M University, I learned from him much knowledge of power systems as well as
unique methodology to explore, formulate and express new ideas.
Special thanks are extended to my committee members Dr. Chanan Singh, Dr.
Edgar Sanchez-Sinencio, and Dr. William Lively for their precious time and valuable
comments.
I also appreciate all the help from my colleagues Mr. Goran Latisko, Mr. Zarko
Djekic, Mr. Yang Wu, Dr. Nan Zhang and Dr. Hongbiao Song.
Acknowledgement is extended to NSF I/UCRC Power Systems Engineering Re-
search Center (PSerc) and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) for their research
funding and CenterPoint Energy for their contribution of experimental data.
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER Page
I INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
B. Scope of Power System Fault Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . 1
C. Solutions for Automated Fault Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . 3
D. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
II BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
B. Power System and Protection System . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
C. Fault Analysis Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1. Rule-based Expert System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Fuzzy Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Petri-nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
D. Substation Equipments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. SCADA System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2. Digital Protective Relay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
E. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
III PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
B. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1. Fault Section Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2. Protection System Performance Evaluation . . . . . . 26
3. Power System/Protection System Interactive Simulation 28
C. Existing Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1. Fault Section Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2. Protection System Performance Evaluation . . . . . . 31
3. Power System/Protection System Interactive Simulation 32
D. Proposed Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1. Fault Section Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2. Protection System Performance Evaluation . . . . . . 35
3. Power System/Protection System Interactive Simulation 36
E. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
viii
CHAPTER Page
IV FAULT SECTION ESTIMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
B. Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-net Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1. Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-net Algorithm . . . . . . . . . 38
2. Fault Section Estimation Model . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3. Improvement Based on Digital Protective Relay Data 50
C. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
V PROTECTION SYSTEM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION . . 56
A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
B. Rule-based Reasoning Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
1. Overall Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2. Automated Relay File Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3. Relay File Data Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4. Rule-based Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
C. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
VI DEVELOPMENT OF POWER SYSTEM/PROTECTION
SYSTEM INTERACTIVE SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT . . 73
A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
B. ATP Compiled Foreign Model Approach . . . . . . . . . . 73
1. Compiled Foreign Model of ATP MODELS Language 73
2. Generic Digital Protective Relay Model . . . . . . . . 75
C. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
VII CASE STUDY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
B. Fault Section Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
1. Test Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2. Test Cases and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
C. Protection System Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . 88
1. Test Environment and Relay Configuration . . . . . . 88
2. Test Cases and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
D. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
VIII IMPLEMENTATION SOLUTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
ix
CHAPTER Page
A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
B. Implementation Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
1. Fault Section Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
2. Protection System Performance Evaluation . . . . . . 99
3. Power System/Protection System Interactive Simulation 101
C. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
IX CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
A. Expected Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
B. Research Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
C. Suggestion for Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
APPENDIX A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
APPENDIX B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
VITA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
xLIST OF TABLES
TABLE Page
I Operands for Ground Distance ZONE 1 Element of D60 relay . . . . 20
II Candidates of faulted sections for the 14-bus system example . . . . 25
III Comparison of digital relay file retrieval modes . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
IV Explanation of backward reasoning process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
V Main features of the generic relay model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
VI User-defined error types of the relay model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
VII Scenario description of Case 1 for the fault section estimation study . 82
VIII SCADA data of Case 1 for the fault section estimation study . . . . 83
IX Relay data of Case 1 for the fault section estimation study . . . . . . 83
X Scenario description of Case 2 for the fault section estimation study . 83
XI SCADA data of Case 2 for the fault section estimation study . . . . 84
XII Relay data of Case 2 for the fault section estimation study . . . . . . 84
XIII Candidates for estimated fault sections based on SCADA data of
Case 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
XIV Candidates for estimated fault sections based on SCADA data
and relay data of Case 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
XV Scenario description of Case 3 for the fault section estimation study . 85
XVI SCADA data of Case 3 for the fault section estimation study . . . . 85
XVII Relay data of Case 3 for the fault section estimation study . . . . . . 86
xi
TABLE Page
XVIII Candidates for estimated fault sections based on SCADA data of
Case 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
XIX Candidates for estimated fault sections based on SCADA data
and relay data of Case 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
XX Scenario of Case 1 for the protection system performance evalua-
tion study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
XXI Scenario of Case 2 for the protection system performance evalua-
tion study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
XXII Scenario of Case 3 for the protection system performance evalua-
tion study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
XXIII Modbus RTU packet format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
XXIV Modbus RTU function codes for file transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
XXV UR relay registers used for file transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
XXVI UR relay file name format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
XXVII SEL ASCII COMMANDS for initiation of file transfer . . . . . . . . 123
XXVIII SEL421 file name format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
XXIX Ymodem receiver bytes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
XXX Ymodem sender packet format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
xii
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE Page
1 Scope of power system fault analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 An example of power system sections with their protection systems . 6
3 Structure of a rule-based expert system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4 An example of forward chaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5 An example of backward chaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6 Membership function of a fuzzy set “integer numbers which are
more or less 6” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7 A Petri-net describing the operations of a protective relay . . . . . . 16
8 A Petri-net representing the ‘Bus 3 Fault’ rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9 Common structure of SCADA systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10 Protection operation chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
11 An example of fault section estimation problem for a 14-bus system . 25
12 An example of pilot protection system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
13 A 14-bus power system model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
14 A FRPN model for L1314 fault based on SCADA data . . . . . . . . 45
15 A FRPN model for B13 fault based on SCADA data . . . . . . . . . 45
16 A FRPN model for L1314 fault based on SCADA and digital
protective relay data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
17 Functional structure of automated protection system performance
evaluation application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
xiii
FIGURE Page
18 Functional structure of automated relay file retrieval module . . . . . 60
19 Functional structure of file data processing module . . . . . . . . . . 61
20 Program flow diagram for calculation of fault inception and clear-
ance time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
21 Program flow diagram for determination of status changes of dig-
ital oscillography data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
22 Conceptual strategy of reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
23 Forward chaining reasoning for prediction of protection operation . . 67
24 Reasoning process for validation of status of logic operands . . . . . . 68
25 Logic reasoning for evaluating operating speed of protection elements 69
26 Backward chaining reasoning for diagnosis of symptoms . . . . . . . 70
27 Make process in the ATP/MinGW program package . . . . . . . . . 75
28 Programming structure of the relay model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
29 14-bus power system model created by an ATPDraw program . . . . 82
30 Principle of DCB scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
31 SEL421 operation logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
32 D60 operation logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
33 Analysis report of Case 1 for the protection system performance
evaluation study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
34 Analysis report of Case 2 of the protection system performance
evaluation study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
35 Analysis report of Case 3 for the protection system performance
evaluation study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
36 Implementation of fault section estimation application . . . . . . . . 98
xiv
FIGURE Page
37 Implementation of protection system performance evaluation application100
38 GUI of automated relay file retrieval module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
39 GUI of protection system performance evaluation application . . . . 101
40 Implementation of power system/protection system interactive
simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
41 GUI of the simulation setting program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
42 Program flow chart for UR relay file retrieval in polling mode . . . . 121
43 Program flow chart for SEL421 relay file retrieval in polling mode . . 125
44 Program flow chart for SEL421 relay file retrieval in report by
exception mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. Introduction
This chapter introduces the scope and solution for power system fault analysis.
It serves as an explanation of the problem domain which the dissertation focuses on.
First, power system fault analysis is classified into two major categories, and sub-
categories are further differentiated. Then the relationship between the two major
categories and the relationship among sub-categories are discussed. Finally the cur-
rent trend towards automated fault analysis is emphasized, and the techniques and
input data are introduced with examples.
B. Scope of Power System Fault Analysis
The increasing competition in the utility industry requires maintaining power
delivery service with minimum interruption. The goal of power system fault anal-
ysis is to provide enough information to utility staff to be able to understand the
reasons for the interruption better, and provide as quick as possible an action to
restore the power delivery. The analysis should also provide enough understanding
of the status of protection system components so that a preventive set of measures
can be implemented to reduce the likelihood of service interruption and damages to
equipment [1].
The scope of power system fault analysis can be generally classified into two
categories: fault event analysis and protection system performance evaluation. Fault
The journal model is IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control.
2event analysis focuses on determination of faulted section, fault type, fault location
and fault inception angle. Protection system performance evaluation is to check
whether a protection system has operated as expected, and if not, what are the
causes.
Within the scope of fault event analysis, determination of faulted section is usu-
ally the first step. There are two reasons. First, it gives the quickest and the most
important information about what happens in the power system. Second, the detailed
fault information such as fault location, fault type and fault inception angle can be
determined more easily and accurately by analyzing the data from the fault recording
equipments close to the faulted section than from those far from the faulted section.
Fault event analysis and protection system performance evaluation have close
relationship, because the fault events and protection systems operate in a cause and
effect manner. Since a fault is the cause of the operation of a protection system, the
status of the protection system will contribute to the analysis of the fault event. On
the other hand, because the protection system is supposed to operate according to
certain fault situation, fault event information such as fault type and fault location
provides reference to the expected status of the protection system and thus contribute
to the evaluation of the protection system. Fig. 1 illustrates the scope of power system
fault analysis as well as the relationship among its sub-categories.
The results of power system fault analysis serve three groups of utility staff. Sys-
tem operators require the fault event information to conduct restoration procedures
to return the system to a normal state as soon as possible. Protection engineers
need the protection system performance information to assess the correctness of the
response of a protection system to a given fault condition. Maintenance staff requires
both the fault event information and protection system performance information to
locate and repair faulted components [1].
3Fault Section 
Estimation 
Fault Location  
Fault Type 
Classification 
Protection System 
Performance 
Evaluation 
Inception Angel 
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Fault Event Analysis
Fig. 1. Scope of power system fault analysis
C. Solutions for Automated Fault Analysis
As the scale of modern power systems grows dramatically, the traditional manual
fault analysis becomes more and more difficult due to the complexity of systems and
large volume of incoming data. To deal with such a dilemma, computer based auto-
mated fault analysis has gained significant attention around the world. The history
on this subject dates to the late eighties when first expert systems for automated
fault analysis based on the data from Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) of Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems were introduced [1]. Since then,
this field has advanced with new developments being pursued in two general direc-
tions. One direction was the introduction of a variety of intelligent techniques, besides
expert systems, such as neural networks, fuzzy logic, Petri-nets, etc.. As examples,
a hybrid expert system was developed for faulted section identification, fault type
classification and selection of fault location algorithms [2]. An Adaptive Resonance
Theory neural network with fuzzy decision rules was proposed to classify power sys-
tem faults [3]. A Petri-nets combined with coding theory is used for fault diagnosis
for substation automation [4].
The other direction was the use of data from Intelligent Electronic Devices
4(IEDs), besides SCADA RTUs, such as Digital Fault Recorders (DFRs), Digital Pro-
tective Relays (DPRs), Sequence of Event Recorders (SERs), etc. As examples, ref-
erence [5] presents a solution for automated fault analysis of disturbance events and
protection system operations using DFR Data. Reference [6] proposes an approach
to perform comprehensive fault analysis by integrating DFR data and DPR data.
D. Summary
The scope and solution of power system fault analysis are introduced in this
chapter. Power system fault analysis can be classified into fault event analysis and
protection system performance evaluation. These two categories have close relation-
ship due to the cause and effect relationship between the fault events and operations
of protection systems. Among the sub-categories of fault event analysis, determina-
tion of faulted section is the first and the most important step. Because of the large
volume of data in modern power systems, computer based automated analysis has
been proposed as a solution to power system fault analysis. This field has advanced
significantly with the application of intelligent techniques and intelligent electronic
devices.
5CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND
A. Introduction
This chapter provides the background knowledge for the dissertation study. First,
different sections of a power system and their corresponding protection systems are
explained. Then the theories of rule-based expert system, fuzzy logic and Petri-
nets, which are the intelligent techniques used for fault analysis, are studied. Finally
SCADA systems and digital protective relays, which are the data sources for fault
analysis, are introduced.
B. Power System and Protection System
A power system is composed of a lot of sections such as generators, transformers,
bus bars and transmission lines. These sections are protected by protective relaying
systems comprising instrument transformers, protective relays, circuit breakers and
communication equipments. In case of a fault occurring on a section, its associated
protective relays should detect the fault and issue trip signals to open their associated
circuit breakers to isolate the faulted section from the rest of the power system, in
order to avoid further damage to the power system. Fig. 2 is an example of power
system sections with their protection systems. G1 is a generator. T1 is a transformer.
B1,...,B5 are bus bars. L45 is a transmission line. RG is a generator protective relay.
RT is a transformer protective relay. RB is a bus protective relay. RL-4,...,RL-9 are
transmission line protective relays. C1,..., C9 are circuit breakers.
6C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
C6
C8
C7
C9
Generator 
Protection 
Transformer 
Protection 
Line 
Protection 
Bus 
Protection
RG RT RL-4 RL-5 RL-6 RL-7
RL-8 RL-9RB
G1
B1 B2
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T1
L45
L67
L89
B4
B5
Fig. 2. An example of power system sections with their protection systems
C. Fault Analysis Techniques
1. Rule-based Expert System
An expert system is a computer system which emulates the decision-making
ability of a human expert. When expert systems were first developed in the 1970’s,
they contained expert knowledge exclusively. Today, the term expert system is often
applied to any solution which uses expert system technology. The knowledge in an
expert system may be either expertise, or knowledge which is generally available from
books and knowledgeable persons. The terms expert system and knowledge-based
system are often used synonymously [7].
The knowledge of a knowledge-based system may be represented in the form of
IF THEN type rules. Such a knowledge-based system is called a rule-based expert
system. The elements of a typical rule-based expert system are shown in Fig. 3. The
knowledge base contains the domain knowledge needed to solve problems coded in
the form of rules. The working memory is a global database of facts used by the rules.
The inference engine makes inferences by deciding which rules are satisfied by facts,
prioritizes the satisfied rules, and executes the rule with the highest priority. The
7Inference Engine 
Knowledge Base
(Rules)
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Facility
Knowledge 
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User Interface
Fig. 3. Structure of a rule-based expert system
user interface is used for communication between the user and the expert system.
The explanation facility presents the reasoning process to a user. The knowledge
acquisition facility establishes an automatic way for the user to enter knowledge into
the system [7].
Each rule in the knowledge base is identified by a name. Following the name is
the IF part of the rule. The section between the IF and THEN part of the rule is
called by various names such as antecedent, conditional part, pattern part, or left-
hand-side(LHS). The individual condition is called a conditional element or a pattern.
A rule whose patterns are all satisfied is said to be activated or instantiated. Multiple
rules may be activated at the same time. In this case, the inference engine must select
one rule for firing. Following the THEN part of a rule is a list of actions to be executed
when the rule fires. These actions usually are insertion, deletion and modification of
facts. This part of the rule is called a consequent or right-hand-side (RHS) [7]. As an
example, a rule expressed in an equivalent pseudocode in an IF THEN format used
to determine a fault on Bus 3 in Fig. 2 is as follows.
Rule: Bus 3 Fault
8F
A B C E
R1 R2
R4
G
I
R3
J
R5
H
D Initial facts
Inferred facts 
Conclusions 
- Given fact
- Missing fact
- Applicable rule
- Inapplicable rule
- inferred fact
- Fact which can not be inferred
Fig. 4. An example of forward chaining
IF
Relay RB tripped AND
Circuit Breaker C5 opened AND
Circuit Breaker C6 opened AND
Circuit Breaker C8 opened
Then
A fault occured on Bus 3
A group of multiple inferences that connect a problem with its solution is called
a chain. Forward chaining is reasoning from facts to conclusions [7]. Fig. 4 illustrates
the concept of forward chaining in a rule-based system. Rules are triggered by the
facts which satisfy their antecedent.For example, rule R1 must be satisfied by facts
A and B for it to be activated. However, only fact B is present and rule R1 is not
activated to produce the fact F. Then R4 is not activated because of the absence
of the fact F. Rule R2 is activated by facts B and C which are present and so rule
R2 produces the intermediate fact G. Other satisfied rules are rule R3 and R5. The
execution of the rule R5 produce the conclusion which is the fact J.
Backward chaining is reasoning in reverse from a hypothesis, which is a potential
conclusion to be proved, to the facts which support the hypothesis. A hypothesis
9A C
H1
B
H2 H4
FE
H3
H5 H6
D
H7
Evidence (facts)
Intermediate hypothesis (sub-goals)
Initial hypothesis
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- Existing Evidence 
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- OR
- AND
Fig. 5. An example of backward chaining
can be viewed as a fact whose truth is in doubt and needs to be established. The
hypothesis can then be interpreted as a goal to be proven [7]. Fig. 5 illustrates the
concept of backward chaining. In order to prove hypothesis H1, at least one of the
intermediate hypotesis H2, H3 and H4 must be proven. To prove H2, fact A must
exist. Since fact A is not present, H2 is disproven. To prove hypothesis H3, both
hypothesis H5 and H6 must be proven. Since the absence of fact B will disprove
hypothesis H5, Hypothesis H3 is disproven. To prove hypothesis H4, hypothesis H7
must be proven. The existence of fact E and F will prove hypothesis H7, hence
hypothesis H4 is proven. Finally hypothesis H1 is proven.
2. Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic is a logic based system that generalizes the classical two-valued logic
for reasoning under uncertainty. The concept of fuzzy sets, the core of fuzzy logic,
was first introduced by Lotfi A. Zadeh in his seminal paper in 1965 [8].
A classical Boolean set A, may be equated with its characteristic function:
ϕA : X −→ {0, 1} (2.1)
which associates with each element x of a universe of discourse X a number ϕ(x) ∈
{0, 1} such that ϕ(x) = 0 means that x does not belong to the set A, and ϕ(x) = 1
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Fig. 6. Membership function of a fuzzy set “integer numbers which are more or less 6”
means that x belongs to the set A.
Unlike the classical Boolean set, elements of a fuzzy set may belong to it to
partial degree, from full belongingness to the full nonbelongingness through all inter-
mediate values. Thus the characteristic function: ϕA : X −→ {0, 1} is replaced by a
membership function:
µA : X −→ [0, 1] (2.2)
such that µA(x) ∈ [0, 1] is the degree to which an element x belongs to the fuzzy
set A. µA(x) ∈ [0, 1] is called the grade of membership [9]. As an example, Fig. 6
describes a trapezoidal membership function of a fuzzy set “integer numbers which
are more or less 6”.
Similarly as in the classical Boolean set theory, the basic operations in fuzzy set
theory are complement, intersection and union.
The complement of a fuzzy set A in X, written as ¬A, is defined as
µ¬A(x) = 1− µA(x) ∀x ∈ X (2.3)
The complement corresponds to the negation ‘not’.
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The intersection of two fuzzy sets A and B in X, written as A
⋂
B, is defined as
µA
⋂
B(x) = µA(x) ∧ µB(x) ∀x ∈ X (2.4)
where ‘∧’ is usually a minimum operation, i.e. a ∧ b = min(a, b). The intersection of
two fuzzy sets corresponds to the connective ‘and’.
The union of two fuzzy sets A and B in X, written as A
⋃
B, is defined as
µA
⋃
B(x) = µA(x) ∨ µB(x) ∀x ∈ X (2.5)
where ‘∨’ is usually the maximum operation, i.e. a ∨ b = max(a, b). The union of
two fuzzy sets corresponds to the connective ‘or’.
It should be mentioned that beside the above conventional basic operations,
some other definitions can also be used. As examples, for intersection, the algebraic
product µA⋂B(x) = µA·µB for intersection and , the probabilistic product µA⋃B(x) =
µA + µB − µA · µB for union are popularly employed [9]. An important issue is the
adequacy of the operations on fuzzy sets, i.e. whether they do reflect the real human
perception of their essence (the real semantics of ‘not’, ‘and’ and ‘or’) [10].
In order to properly represent real-world knowledge where ambiguous, vague and
imprecise data are involved, fuzzy rules have been used for knowledge representation
[11]. A fuzzy rule is a rule describing the fuzzy relation between two propositions.
Let R be a set of fuzzy rules R = {R1, R2, ..., Rn}. The general formulation of the
ith fuzzy rule is as follows:
Ri(ci): IF Pj(θj) THEN Pk(θk)
where Pj and Pk are propositions which may contain some fuzzy variables. The truth
of each proposition θj, θk are a real values. θj ∈ [0, 1], θk ∈ [0, 1]. ci ∈ [0, 1]. It
represents the strength of the belief in the rule. The larger the value is, the more the
rule is believed in.
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If the antecedent part or the consequent part of a fuzzy rule contains ‘and’ and/or
‘or’ connectives, it is called a composite fuzzy rule. The composite fuzzy rule can be
classified into the following types [12]:
Type 1: Ri(ci): P1(θ1) AND P2(θ2) AND ... AND Pk−1(θk−1) −→ Pk(θk)
Type 2: Ri(ci): P1(θ1) −→ P2(θ2) AND ... AND Pk−1(θk−1) AND Pk(θk)
Type 3: Ri(ci): P1(θ1) OR P2(θ2) OR ... OR Pk−1(θk−1) −→ Pk(θk)
Type 4: Ri(ci): P1(θ1) −→ P2(θ2) OR ... OR Pk−1(θk−1) OR Pk(θk)
Rules of Type 4 are unsuitable for deducing control because they make no specific
implication. We will focus on the first three types of rules.
The reasoning results of the first three types of rules can be expressed as Eq. 2.6,
Eq. 2.7, Eq. 2.8 respectively.
θk = OP∩(θ1, θ2, ..., θk−1) ∗ ci (2.6)
where OP∩ is an operation corresponding to the connective ‘and’.
θ2 = θ1 ∗ ciθ3 = θ1 ∗ ci...θk = θ1 ∗ ci (2.7)
θk = OP∪(θ1, θ2, ..., θk−1) ∗ ci (2.8)
where OP∪ is an operation corresponding to the connective ‘or’.
As an example, the rule ‘Bus 3 Fault’ discussed in previous section is written as
a fuzzy rule and is given certainty factor of the rule and truth values of antecedent
propositions as follows:
Rule: Bus 3 Fault (0.9)
IF
Relay RB trips (0.9)AND
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Circuit Breaker C5 opens (0.8)AND
Circuit Breaker C6 opens (0.8)AND
Circuit Breaker C8 opens (0.8)
Then
A fault occurs on Bus 3
If the OP∩ takes the form of minimum operation, the reasoning result will be as
follows:
A fault occurs on Bus 3 with truth value of θ = min(0.9, 0.8, 0.8, 0.8) ∗ 0.9 = 0.72
3. Petri-nets
Petri-nets technique is first introduced by Carl A. Petri in 1962. It is a graphical
and mathematical tool. The graphical aspect allows easy representation of the in-
teraction between discrete events: parallelism, synchronism, precedence, alternatives
and so on. The mathematical aspects allows formal modeling of these interactions
and analysis of the properties of the modeled system. A formal definition of Petri-nets
is as follows [9]:
Let N be the set of natural numbers and zero.
A Petri-nets is a 4-tuple
(P, T, Pre, Post)
where
1. P = {p1, p2, ..., pn} is a finite set of places.
2. T = {t1, t2, ..., tm} is a finite set of transitions.
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3. Pre is the input incidence function:
Pre : P × T −→ N .
4. Post is the output incidence function:
Post : P × T −→ N .
In the graphical representation of a Petri-net, places are denoted by circles and
transitions by bars. Places are the nodes describing the states (a place is a partial
state) and the transitions depict the state changes. The Pre incidence function
describes the directed arcs connecting places to transitions. Pre(p, t) is the weight of
the arc (p, t). The absence of an arc between a place p and a transition t is denoted
by Pre(p, t) = 0. The Post incidence function describes the directed arcs connecting
transitions to places. Post(p, t) is the weight of the arc (t, p). The absence of an arc
between a transition and a place is donated by Post(p, t) = 0.
In the matrical representation of a Petri-net, Pre is a n ×m matrix of n rows
(the places) and m columns (the transitions) whose elements belong to N . The vector
Pre(·, t) denotes the input arcs of transition t with their weights. Post is a n × m
matrix of n rows (the places) and m columns (the transitions) whose elements belong
to N . The vector Post(·, t) denotes the output arcs of transition t with their weights.
A marking M of a Petri-net (P, T, Pre, Post) is a function M : P −→ N . It is a
distribution of tokens in the places. It can be represented by a vector of dimension
n of natural numbers. For p ∈ P , M(p) is the token load of place p and represents
a partial state of the system described by the Petri-nets. A marked Petri-net is a
2-tuple (N,M0) where: N is a Petri-net and M0 is its initial marking which is a
function M0 : P −→ N .
A transition t of a Petri-net is enabled for markingM if and only ifM ≥ Pre(·, t).
This enabling condition expressed under the form of an inequality between two vectors
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is equivalent to
M(p) ≥ Pre(p, t) ∀p ∈ P (2.9)
Only enabled transitions can be fired. If M is a marking of a Petri-net enabling
transition t and M ′ is the marking derived by the firing of t from M , then
M ′ =M + C(·, t) (2.10)
where
C(·, t) = Post(·, t) − Pre(·, t) is called the incidence matrix of the corresponding
Petri-net.
As an example, a Petri-net modeling the operations of a protective relay is pre-
sented in Fig. 7. As shown in the figure, a protective relay has three states, dropout,
pickup and operation which are represented by p1, p2 and p3 respectively. The power
system component protected by the relay has two states, absence of fault and exis-
tence of fault which are represented by p4 and p5 respectively. When a fault inception
occurs, transition t1 fires. The power system component protected by a relay goes
into “existence of fault state” from “absence of fault” state. At the same time, the
relay senses the fault and goes into “pickup” state from “dropout” state. When the
relay’s coordination timer is due, transition t2 fires. The relay goes into “operation”
state from “pickup” state. When the operation of the relay trips associated circuit
breaker to clear the fault, transition t3 fires. The power system component protected
by the relay goes back to “absence of fault” state and the relay goes back to “dropout”
state.
In the matrical representation, the structure of the Petri-net is given by the
following matrices.
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p1
p4
p2p3
p5
t2 t1t3
p1: Relay Dropout
p2: Relay Pickup
p3: Relay Operation 
p4: No Fault
p5: Fault Duration
t2: Relay Timer Due
t3: Fault Clearance 
t1: Fault Inception 
Fig. 7. A Petri-net describing the operations of a protective relay
t1 t2 t3 t1 t2 t3
Pre =

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
1 0 0
0 0 1

p1
p2
p3
p4
p5
Post =

0 0 1
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
1 0 0

p1
p2
p3
p4
p5
The initial marking M0 is given by the vector
M0 =
[
1 0 0 1 0
]T
The initial marking will enable t1 and the firing of t1 will result in the marking
M1 according to Eq. 2.10.
M1 =
[
1 0 0 1 0
]T
+
[
0 1 0 0 1
]T
−
[
1 0 0 1 0
]T
=
[
0 1 0 0 1
]T
Such a marking represents the state when fault exists and relay picks up. The
dynamics of t2 and t3 firing can also be described by Eq. 2.10 in a similar way.
Several extensions have been proposed for Petri-nets such as hierarchical nets,
high level nets, temporal nets. An important extension comes with the investigation of
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(BR Trip)
(CB5 Open)
(CB6 Open)
(CB8 Open)
p1
p2
p3
p4
t1
(Bus 3 Fault)p5
Fig. 8. A Petri-net representing the ‘Bus 3 Fault’ rule
the connection between logic and Petri-nets. A Petri-net can be applied to rule-based
reasoning using proposition logic, where tokens represent the states of propositions [9].
As an example, the rule ‘Bus 3 Fault’ discussed in previous section can be represented
by a portion of a Petri-net shown in Fig. 8.
D. Substation Equipments
1. SCADA System
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) System is most widely used data acquisition equipment in substations.
They are capable of recording status signals such as relay targets, circuit breaker sta-
tus, transformer status and substation alarms, as well as analog signals such as bus
voltages and line currents [13]. The recorded data from RTUs distributed in substa-
tions at different locations can be transferred to a central control center via certain
communication links. Fig. 9 shows the common structure of SCADA systems.
There are several limitations of SCADA systems, which may restrict its perfor-
mance in power system fault analysis applications.
1. The number of I/O ports of RTUs is limited. For monitoring of protection
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RTU1 RTU2
…...
RTU3 RTU4
…...
SCADA System SCADA System
Relay and Breaker Status   Relay and Breaker Status   
Substation A Substation B
Central  Control 
Center 
WAN
Fig. 9. Common structure of SCADA systems
system status, usually only relay trip signals and circuit breaker status signals
are selected to be recorded. Due to the limitation, it is difficult to use additional
information such as zone of operation, pickup, circuit breaker control circuit
status to improve the determination of relay trip and circuit breaker switching
status signals.
2. The timing accuracy of events recorded by RTUs is limited. RTUs usually
have low scanning rates, which may be in the order of seconds. In practice,
some RTUs use flags to label recorded events and then time-tag them using the
scanning time. That means many events occurring in a short time interval may
have the same time-stamp. Some other RTUs do not time-tag recorded events
in the first place. Instead, the time when the master computer of the SCADA
system receives event information is used as the time-stamp. Since there are
always time delays because of data transmission, the timing accuracy of events
is further degraded. Such limitation makes using sequence of events information
difficult.
19
2. Digital Protective Relay
To achieve maximum flexibility, the firmware of digital relays is designed using the
concept of functional elements. These elements usually include protection elements,
control elements, and input and output contacts. The statuses of each element are
represented by a set of predefined logic operands. As examples, Table I shows several
logic operands for Ground Distance Zone 1 Element of GE’s D60 relay [14].
Although relays from different manufacturers have different syntax for their logic
operands, the functions of logic operands remain the same. First, logic operands can
be used as logic variables to produce more complex schemes by logic operators in
field programmable logic function provided by relays. Second, logic operands give
information on the actual statuses of elements. Time-stamped logic operands are
used as event record data to reflect detailed relay behaviors. Logic operands can
also be recorded as digital oscillography data so that the statuses of elements can be
visualized [14,15].
When fault occurs, elements change their statuses according to their design prin-
ciples and settings. A timed protection operation chain will be formed in order to
trip the circuit breaker associated with the relay to interrupt fault currents in pre-
determined time. Fig. 10 illustrates the protection operation chain. In this chain,
pickup of individual phases of elements is the first step and the current interruption
by circuit breaker is the last step.
Along the chain, operation of any individual phase of an element will cause
operation of the entire element. That is to say, operation of individual phases of
a protection element triggers operation of the entire element through ‘or’ relation.
Likewise, operation of several protection elements also triggers the relay trip through
‘or’ relation. Operation of an element may be blocked by pickup or operation of an-
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Table I. Operands for Ground Distance ZONE 1 Element of D60 relay
Operand Syntax Description
GND DIST Z1 PKP Ground Distance Zone 1 has picked up
GND DIST Z1 OP Ground Distance Zone 1 has operated
GND DIST Z1 PKP A Ground Distance Zone 1 Phase A has picked up
GND DIST Z1 OP B Ground Distance Zone 1 Phase B has operated
GND DIST Z1 DPO C Ground Distance Zone 1 Phase C has dropped out
Pickup of
 individual phases of 
protection elements 
Operation of 
individual phases of 
protection elements 
Assertion of relay trip logic 
signal 
Action of relay trip contact
Circuit breaker opening 
Fault  
Currents interruption 
by circuit breaker
Operation of  protection 
elements 
Fig. 10. Protection operation chain
other element or external block signals if pilot communication schemes are involved.
Most digital protective relays possess the capability of generating files which con-
tain detailed data about power system fault disturbances and corresponding responses
of protection system components. These data can be classified into four categories,
namely oscillography data, setting data, fault data and event record data. Generally,
oscillography data contain the records of what a relay “sees” during a disturbance
event. Setting data specifies how the relay is configured. Fault data presents fault
disturbance information calculated by the relay. Event data reveal how the relay and
associated protection components actually respond to the disturbance event. Besides
these relay-generated data, performance specification data such as the average pickup
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time for a phase distance element and average opening time for a circuit breaker are
also important information. They are usually contained in user’s manuals. Further
description of relay file data is as follows:
1. Oscillography data: Oscillography data are generated by the fault recording
function of a digital relay. Secondary voltages and currents coming into the
relay are recorded as analog channels while statuses of both external contacts
and internal states of the relay can be recorded as digital channels by users’
selection.
2. Setting data: Setting data specify configuration parameters of a relay. Usually
setting data configures the relay at three levels: selecting protection elements,
deciding how the selected elements are logically combined, and setting operating
parameters of each selected element.
3. Fault data usually include fault type, fault location, and voltage and current
phasors during pre-fault and fault periods. They are calculated by a relay, but
they may or may not be used for the relay decision making, depending on the
relay design and application circumstances.
4. Event record data: Event record data are time-stamped logic operands in
chronological order. It contains most of the information through which the
external behavior of a relay and its associated protection system components
and the internal states of the relay can be observed. According to our investi-
gation, for some types of relays, not all logic operands that are important for
analysis are reflected by event record data. This problem can be solved if users
select these operands to be recorded in the oscillography files.
5. Performance specification data: Performance specification data define the relay
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operating parameters which can be used to predict expected protection oper-
ation. Examples are the average pickup time of a phase distance element and
the average opening time of a circuit breaker. Performance specification data
are usually contained in user’s manuals.
E. Summary
The background knowledge for the dissertation study is provided in this chapter.
A power system consists of a lot of sections, which are protected by their correspond-
ing protection systems. Based on such a relation, protection system data can be
utilized for fault analysis. Rule-based expert system has strength in reasoning. Fuzzy
logic excels in handling uncertainty. Petri-nets is an ideal graphical and mathemat-
ical tool to model and analyze discrete events. These intelligent techniques can be
employed to deal with various complex fault analysis problems. SCADA systems are
the traditional data source in power systems. Several limitations of SCADA systems
may restrict their performance in fault analysis applications. Intelligent electronic de-
vices such as digital protective relays provide abundant information about protection
system operation as well as fault events for fault analysis applications.
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CHAPTER III
PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED
A. Introduction
This chapter discusses the specific problems to be solved by the dissertation study.
First, the problems of fault section estimation, protection system performance evalu-
ation, and power system/protection system interactive simulation are presented and
the complexities of the three problems are explained. Then the existing approaches
to the three problems are presented and their shortcomings and disadvantages are
emphasized. Finally the proposed approaches are outlined and their strengths to
solve the problems are discussed.
B. Problem Statement
1. Fault Section Estimation
The problem of identification of faulted section is called fault section estimation.
When a fault occurs on a certain section, the protection devices of protection systems
will reach certain statuses accordingly. In the point view of a diagnosis problem, the
fault on a given section is the cause, the statuses of the protection devices are effects.
Thus the problem of fault section estimation can be defined as a diagnosis problem as
follows: Given a set of observed statuses of protection devices, the goal is to identify
the faulted power system section which explains those observations.
When a single fault occurs and all the statuses of protection devices are correctly
observed, the fault section estimation problem is relatively simple. However, when
multiple faults, failures of protection devices, and false data are involved, the task
can be stressful and time consuming for system operators, because many situations
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can be hypothesized and the possibility of each of those situations needs to be ex-
amined. Multiple faults involve two or more faults which occur at the same time or
in a short time interval at different locations of a power system. The multiple fault
scenarios usually happen when cascading events occur. When protection devices fail
to operate, backup protection devices will operate, which will cause more sections of
a power system to be isolated. False data may be introduced by the logic of pro-
tection devices, measurement systems or communication systems. Multiple faults,
failures of protection devices, and false data add uncertainty when identifying the
actual faulted sections. When all the situations mix up, complexity of fault section
estimation increases significantly.
A 14-bus power system and its protection systems shown in Fig. 11 are used as
an example to explain the complexity. In Fig. 11, each bus bar is equipped with a
bus relay. Each terminal of a transmission line is equipped with a main distance relay
with forward zones. The distance relay also backs up the remote bus relay and the
distance relays on the neighboring transmission lines in its forward direction. A bus
bar is denoted as BXX. A bus relay shares the same number with its associated bus
bar. A transmission line is denoted as LXX-XX, where XX is the number of the bus
bar at each terminal of the transmission line. At each line terminal, a circuit breaker
shares the same number with its associated distance relay.
A line fault F1 occurred on the line L13-14. The distance relays, RD38 and RD39,
operated to send the trip signal to the circuit breakers, C38 and C39, respectively.
Both of the two circuit breakers opened successfully. At this moment, a bus fault
F2 occurred on the bus B13. The bus relay RB13 operated and sent trip signals to
all the associated circuit breakers, C36, C37 and C38. However, the trip signal was
not observed due to an error in the measurement system and the circuit breakers,
C36 and C37, failed to open due to mechanical problems. Then the distance relay
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F2
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RD39
RD38
RB13
RD36RD37
RD35
RD21
Fig. 11. An example of fault section estimation problem for a 14-bus system
Table II. Candidates of faulted sections for the 14-bus system example
Candidate No. Faulted Section(s) Failed Protection Device(s) False Data
1 L13-14 C38 C38 status (should be re-
ported closed but was falsely
reported open)
2 L13-14, L12-13 RD37, C37 No false data
3 L13-14, L06-13 RD36, C36 No false data
4 L13-14, B13 C36, C37 RB13 trip signal (should be
reported but was not re-
ported )
RD35 on the line L12-13 and the distance relay RD 21 on the Line L06-13 operated
as backup relays to open the circuit breakers, C35 and C21, respectively. Both of
the two circuit breakers opened successfully. In such a scenario, several assumptions
about the faulted sections can be made according to the observed relay trip signals
and circuit breaker status signals. They are listed in Table II. As we can see, there
are several candidates for faulted sections. Unless further investigations are made, it
is difficult to tell where the actual faulted sections are.
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2. Protection System Performance Evaluation
The well established criteria for protection system performance are dependability
and security. Loss of dependability means the protection system is unable to trip when
required, while loss of security means the protection system falsely trips when it is not
expected to trip [16,17]. In the context of fault analysis, the evaluation of protection
system performance is to see if the system will operate or not operate as expected
and diagnose the reasons for unexpected operations. The reasons for an unexpected
operation may be a primary failure due to aging or random environmental stress, a
secondary failure due to operating conditions that are out of design tolerance, and a
command error due to incorrect input signals, settings and design [18]. The evaluation
may involve several levels including the overall system, an individual device in the
system and an element of a device.
The evaluation of protection system performance includes both identification of
correct and incorrect operations, and diagnosis of the reasons for incorrect operations.
There are several issues involved. First, a proper model of the protection system must
be built in order to simulate the protection system operations. Second, an efficient
mechanism needs to be employed so that the unexpected operations can be identified.
Third, a sound strategy to trace the reasons for unexpected operations should be
implemented. All the three issues render difficulties. To explain these difficulties,
an EHV transmission line protection system using Directional Comparison Blocking
(DCB) pilot scheme via Power Line Carrier (PLC) is shown in Fig. 12.
The protection system comprises two parts located at the terminal R and the
terminal S of the transmission line respectively. The two parts are identical in func-
tions and configurations but may interact with each other via communication signals.
Each part mainly includes current transformers, voltage transformers, a protective re-
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CB R
CVT R
HYB R
Transmission
Line 
ST
FD
R
Xmtr
Rcvr
Wave 
Trap R
S
Wave 
Trap S
Relay R
Communication  
Equipment R
CT R
CB S
CT S
Relay S
ST
FD
Xmtr
Rcvr
CVT S
HYB S
Communication  
Equipment S
CT: current transformer;  CVT: coupling capacitor voltage transformer; HYB: hybrid circuit; CB: circuit breaker; 
ST: starter; FD: fault detector; Xmtr: transmitter; Rcvr: receiver
Fig. 12. An example of pilot protection system
lay, a circuit breaker and communication equipments. In the protective relay, several
protection elements need to be configured to act as a starter and a fault detector to
detect faults and discriminate the fault direction. The sensitivity, the reach of oper-
ating zone, and the timing of the starter and the fault detector should be coordinated
well. The communication equipment includes a transmitter, a receiver and a hybrid
circuit for impedance matching. They are in charge of sending and receiving block
signals. The timing of the local trip signal must be carefully coordinated with the
timing of the block signal sent from the remote terminal.
Modeling such a protection system requires that the protection scheme of the
system, the behaviors of individual devices, and the dynamic interactions between
individual devices be well understood and simulated to the necessary degree. To
identify unexpected operations, not only the abnormal status needs to be observed but
also the abnormal timing and sequence should be paid attention to. To diagnose the
reasons for unexpected operations, the challenge lies in the fact that the unexpected
operation of an element may be caused by a failure of the element itself or a failure
of neighboring elements. To trace the ultimate reasons, the causal relations among
elements should be taken into consideration.
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To analyze the performance of such a system, as much as 20 designated check
points are recommended by the Power System Relaying Committee of IEEE Power
Engineering Society [19].
3. Power System/Protection System Interactive Simulation
The study of computer based power system/protection system interactive simu-
lation generally covers power system network modeling, protective relay modeling and
dynamic interaction between the power system network models and the relay models.
The simulation is quite valuable for preliminary testing of relay algorithms, study
of multi-terminal, coordinated relaying schemes, and evaluation of relay performance
during cascade events [20,21]. It plays important role in power system fault analysis
because of two reasons. First, the cause and effect relation of power system faults
and protection system behaviors can be can be studied in detail through interactive
simulation. Second, the simulation can provide test data for various fault analysis
applications.
The challenge of power system/protection system interactive simulation lies in
modeling of sophisticated protection systems, and interfacing the protection system
model and power system network model seamlessly. A protection system, especially a
multifunctional digital protective relay consists of many functional components such
as the interface to the power system and other protection systems, analog filters,
analog to digital converters and protection elements implementing various protection
algorithms. Besides, it is also capable of initializing its settings through relay set files
and generating oscillography files and event reports to record what it “sees” and how
it responds. To model such a sophisticated system requires a powerful programming
language and good software design philosophy. The seamless interface between the
protection system model and power system network model means that on one hand,
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the measurements from the power system model can be passed to the protection
system model with minimal intervention and delay; on the other hand, the control
signals from the protection system model can be passed to the power system model to
open or close switches with minimal intervention and delay. In such a way, a real-time
close loop simulation can be achieved [22].
C. Existing Approaches
1. Fault Section Estimation
Expert System (ES) is the earliest artificial intelligence technique applied to
the problem of fault section estimation. Since the late eighties, various applications
based on ES technique for fault section estimation have been reported in literature
[2, 23–25]. Expert systems basically mimic the problem-solving behavior of experts
using domain knowledge acquired during the knowledge acquisition process [26]. Since
the fault section estimation is generally a diagnosis problem involving a number of
fact-rule comparisons and consequent search steps which are usually used by fault
analysis experts, the ES technique is well suited for that purpose. To achieve precise
inference in complex cases, knowledge bases used in expert systems must involve a
great number of rules covering all kinds of scenarios. The procedure of knowledge
acquisition and knowledge base maintenance is quite burdensome. The response time
of expert systems is usually not applicable to a real-time environment due to their
conventional knowledge representation and inference mechanism.
Artificial Neural Network (ANN) technique is proposed as another potential solu-
tion to the problem of fault section estimation, as discussed in several papers [27–31].
ANN is a massively parallel distributed processor made up of simple processing units,
which has a natural propensity for storing experimental knowledge [32]. The justifi-
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cation for application of ANN to the problem of fault section estimation lies in the
fact that fault section estimation can be formulated as a problem of pattern recog-
nition by mapping various combinations of statuses of protective relays and circuit
breakers to faulted sections. This problem can be well solved by ANN’s excellent
non-linear input-output mapping capability. Some problems still remain unsolved in
practical applications, such as slow convergence in the training process, and trivial
determination process for the network parameters like hidden units, layers, learning
rate and momentum value. The ANN approach has bad transparency, i.e., we can
not determine how results are achieved. When any configuration of the power system
or the protection system changes, the entire ANN needs to be re-trained.
In recent years, Petri-nets (PN) technique , which possesses the characteristics
of graphic knowledge representation and parallel information processing, have gained
researchers’ strong interests, as demonstrated in the papers [4, 33–35]. Petri-nets are
based on the concept that the relationships between the components of a system,
which exhibits asynchronous and concurrent activities, could be represented by a
net [33]. They are widely used to model and analyze discrete event systems. During
a fault clearance process, the behavior of protection systems in terms of status changes
of their components as well as the fault occurrence can be viewed as discrete events.
Thus the behavior of protection systems and their relation to the fault occurrence
can be modeled by Petri nets. This is the basic principle of Petri Nets approach to
fault section estimation.
Besides the techniques discussed above, Fuzzy Logic technique is also employed
to solve the problem of fault section estimation, as reported in the literature [36–38].
Fuzzy Logic offers a convenient means for modeling inexactness and uncertainties,
hence a possible solution to handle the uncertainties due to unexpected operations
of protective devices and false data in the problem of fault section estimation. The
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greatest inconvenience of Fuzzy Logic approach lies in the choice of the membership
functions, usually defined based on empirical data.
Most of the solutions mentioned above are based on data from RTUs of SCADA
systems. They only utilize rather limited data such as relay trip signals and circuit
breaker status signals.
2. Protection System Performance Evaluation
Many fault section estimation solutions discussed in previous section are also
able to identify failures and misoperations of protective relays and circuit breakers,
which can be viewed as the overall performance evaluation for the protection systems.
The principle is straightforward. After the exact fault section is figured out, the
correct statuses of related protective relays and circuit breakers can be assumed and
compared with the actual ones. However, the detailed evaluation of protection system
performance can not be carried out because both the elaborated models of protection
systems and the data reflecting detailed behaviors of protection systems are not used
in those fault section estimation solutions.
In order to perform detailed evaluation of protection system performance, model-
based approach is addressed in several papers [39–41]. However, the strategies dis-
cussed in these papers are quite different.
Reference [39] adopts consistency based reasoning mechanism. First, the correct
behavior of each protection device and their interconnections are modeled. Then
all the observed values are propagated through the modeled system, from inputs to
outputs, and in the reverse direction. During the propagation, the output value of
each device is predicted and the environment set which contains the path of devices
employed to reach the predicted value is stored. If there are discrepancies within a
set of predicted values for the output of a device, the union of the environment sets of
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the discrepancies creates a conflict set. Within a conflict set at least one device must
be malfunctioned. Finally all the conflict sets are combined to produce candidate
sets which show the possible combinations of malfunctioned devices. Reference [40]
further proposes a temporal representation method and a toolset for reusing existing
protection device models used to improve the solution discussed in [39]. How to
couple the proposed temporal representation method into existing protection device
models needs to be further investigated.
In [41], both the correct and faulty behavior of protective devices is specified by
Augmented Reactive Model (ARM) and the timing constraints are represented by
time intervals. Then a linear equation solver and a linear programming algorithm
are employed to search for a set of transition paths which best justify the observed
behavior. Thus the malfunctioned devices can be identified and diagnosed. The
difficulty which such a method has to face is that all faulty behavior of protective
devices must be defined and modeled in advance. Given the complexity under certain
conditions, it may be impractical to classify and model all faulty modes.
3. Power System/Protection System Interactive Simulation
Previous research explored various options related to the software programs for
modeling of power system networks and protective relays, and the schemes for inter-
facing the power system network models and the protective relay models [42]. They
generally fall into three categories. The use of electromagnetic transients program
(EMTP) for power system network modeling, and the transient analysis of control sys-
tem (TACS) functions of EMTP for protective relay modeling is reported in the early
literature [43]. Complied FORTRAN subroutine called from TACS in the EPRI/DCG
version of EMTP is also used to develop protective relay models as reported in [44].
The MODELS language of the alternative transient program (ATP) version of EMTP,
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which is an enhancement to TACS, is employed for protective relay modeling as re-
ported in [45,46]. A prominent advantage of these approaches is the easy interfacing
between the power system network models and the protective relay models because
the TACS and MODELS are inherently embedded in EMTP/ATP [47–49].
A scheme which uses an “interaction buffer” for interfacing power system net-
works modeled by EMTP and protective relays modeled by MATLAB is described
in [20]. Another method for establishing the link between EMTP and MATLAB is
discussed in [50]. It is an interconnection where the internal computation engine of
MATLAB is directly accessed by the FORTRAN code in EMTP. By these approaches,
the high-level computation facilities of MATLAB can be utilized for protective relay
modeling while the interconnection between the relay models and the power system
network models is maintained.
An approach where power system network models are created in MATLAB/Power
System Blockset and protective relay models are developed in MATLAB/SIMULINK
is presented in [51]. The interfacing is easily achieved since both the power sys-
tem network models and the protective relay models are under context of MAT-
LAB/SIMULINK [52–54].
Despite the obvious advantages, the approaches discussed above have their in-
herent limitations. With respect to the first category of approaches, sophisticated
relay models are difficult to be developed by TACS, MODELS and FORTRAN due
to their limited flexibility and programmability. The “interaction buffer” and the pro-
grammed link discussed in the second category will cost excessive simulation time.
They also cause the entire simulation program lack of integrity and portability. The
problem of the third category lies in the slow simulation speed when the power system
networks modeled by MATLAB/Power System Blockset are of large scale.
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D. Proposed Approaches
1. Fault Section Estimation
Rule-based expert systems have demonstrated powerful reasoning capability in
various diagnosis problems including fault section estimation. Their disadvantages
lie in the burdensome procedure of rule base building and maintenance. It has been
proved that Petri-nets can be translated into production rule systems [55]. So it is
feasible to realize rule-based reasoning using Petri-nets formalism. Such Petri-nets for
knowledge representation not only hold the strength of rule-based reasoning, but also
overcome the disadvantages of conventional rule-based expert systems in that [12]:
1. Petri-nets’ graphical nature allows one to visualize the structure of a rule-based
system and make the models relatively simple and legible.
2. Petri-nets’ mathematical foundation allows one to express the dynamic behavior
of a system in algebraic forms.
In order to deal with uncertainty, fuzzy logic has been introduced into Petri-
nets for knowledge representation to form Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-nets (FRPN) [12].
FRPN technique is quite well suited to deal with the complexities in the problem of
fault section estimation because:
1. Multiple faults can be identified as the members of a candidate set by the virtue
of fuzzy set theory.
2. False or uncertainty information can also be tackled by fuzziness of data.
3. Various backup protection operations due to unexpected operations of protec-
tion devices can be handled by the parallel reasoning capability.
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4. The rule base and parameters are all represented in matrix forms and the whole
reasoning process is implemented by matrix operations, which significantly fa-
cilitates the procedure of rule base building and maintenance.
In the study of the dissertation, FRPN diagnosis models for a 14-bus system
based on relay trip signals and circuit breaker status signals acquired by RTUs of
SCADA systems are formulated. As an improvement, the logic operand data of digital
protective relays such as pickup and operation information of protection elements,
which are more reliable than SCADA data, are used as additional inputs to the
diagnosis models.
2. Protection System Performance Evaluation
The issues of protection system performance evaluation include acquiring data
to observe the actual operations of the protection system, modeling the protection
system to simulate its operations, employing a mechanism to identify unexpected
operations and implementing a strategy to trace the reasons for unexpected opera-
tions. In the study of the dissertation, an automated protection system performance
evaluation application has been developed to accomplish all the tasks.
The application automatically retrieves relay files upon their generation based
on certain file transfer mechanism, processes relay file data through text parsing and
signal processing techniques, and performs analysis by a rule-based expert system, in
which forward chaining reasoning is used for prediction of expected protection opera-
tion while backward chaining reasoning is used for diagnosis of unexpected protection
operations.
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3. Power System/Protection System Interactive Simulation
In the study of the dissertation, a novel power system/protection system inter-
active simulation approach is proposed. In this approach, the power system network
is modeled by the ATP program while the “compiled foreign model” mechanism of
MODELS language is employed to model the digital protective relay in C++ lan-
guage, which allows relay modeling in an “object-oriented” way as well as building a
“seamless” interface between the power system network model and the relay model.
An ATP/MinGW software package is used to facilitate the entire compilation and
link process. A setting program is developed to facilitate the fault scenario setup,
relay settings and user-defined error insertion. As a result, the enhanced relay model
representation, the “seamless” interface between the power system network model and
the relay model, and the easy scenario setup, make the overall interactive simulation
more powerful and flexible.
E. Summary
The three problems to be solved by the dissertation study are discussed in this
chapter. In the problem of fault section estimation, the complexities lie in the mix of
multiple faults, failures of protection devices, and false data. In the problem of protec-
tion system performance evaluation, there are difficulties in building a proper model,
identifying unexpected operations and tracing the causes of unexpected operations.
In the problem of power system/protection system interactive simulation, challenges
are the protection system modeling and the “seamless” interaction between the power
system network models and the protection system models. Various approaches solv-
ing these three problems been presented in the literature. Their disadvantages limit
their functionality and implementations. In the dissertation, by identifying their
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advantages over existing approaches, Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-nets, rule-based expert
system and “compiled foreign model” mechanism are proposed as solutions to the
problems of fault section estimation, protection system performance evaluation, and
power system/protection system interactive simulation respectively.
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CHAPTER IV
FAULT SECTION ESTIMATION
A. Introduction
This chapter discusses a Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-net (FRPN) approach to solve
the problem of fault section estimation. First, the formal definition of FRPN is
described and its algorithm is detailed [12]. Then the fault diagnosis models for a
14-bus system is developed based on FRPN formalism and SCADA data. Finally the
fault diagnosis models based on both SCADA data and digital protective relay data
as an improvement is further discussed.
B. Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-net Approach
1. Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-net Algorithm
A Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-net (FRPN) can be defined as an 8-tuple [12]:
(P,R, I, O,H, θ, γ, C)
where
1. P = {p1, p2, ..., pn} is a finite set of places or called propositions.
2. R = {r1, r2, ..., rm} is a finite set of transitions or called rules.
3. I : P × R −→ {0, 1} is an n ×m input matrix defining the directed arcs from
propositions to rules. I(pi, rj) = 1, if there is a directed arc from pi to rj, and
I(pi, rj) = 0, if there is no directed arcs from pi to rj, for i = 1, 2, ..., n, and
j = 1, 2, ...,m.
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4. O : P ×R −→ {0, 1} is an n×m output matrix defining the directed arcs from
rules to propositions. O(pi, rj) = 1, if there is a directed arc from rj to pi, and
O(pi, rj) = 0, if there is no directed arcs from rj to pi, for i = 1, 2, ..., n, and
j = 1, 2, ...,m.
5. H : P ×R −→ {0, 1} is an n×m matrix defining the complementary arcs from
propositions to rules. H(pi, rj) = 1, if there is a complementary arc from pi
to rj, and H(pi, rj) = 0, if there is no complementary arcs from pi to rj, for
i = 1, 2, ..., n, and j = 1, 2, ...,m.
6. θ is a truth degree vector. θ = (θ1, θ2, ..., θn)
T , where θi ∈ [0, 1] means the truth
degree of pi, i = 1, 2, ..., n. The initial truth degree vector is denoted by θ
0.
7. γ : P −→ {0, 1} is a marking vector. γ = (γ1, γ2, ..., γn)T . γi = 1, if there is a
token in pi, and γi = 0, if pi is not marked. An initial marking is denoted by
γ0.
8. C = diag{c1, c2, ..., cm}. cj is the confidence of rj, j = 1, 2, ...,m.
The 5-tuple (P,R, I, O,H) is the basic FRPN structure that defines a directed
graph. The updates of the truth degree vector θ through the firing of a set of rules
describe the dynamic reasoning process of the modeled system. If the truth degree
of a proposition is known at a certain reasoning step, a token is assigned to the
corresponding proposition, which is associated with the value between 0 and 1. The
token is represented by a dot. When a proposition pi has no token, which means
that the truth degree is unknown at that step, θi = 0. Hence, θi = 0 implies two
possible situations: 1) the absence of token, which means truth degree of proposition
pi, is unknown; 2) a token with zero value, which means that the truth degree of
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proposition pi is known and equals zero. Marking vector γ can be used to distinguish
the two situations.
In order to represent the execution rules of FRPN formally, some operators are
used.
1.
⊕
: A
⊕
B = D, where A, B, and D are all m×n-dimensional matrices, such
that dij = max{aij, bij}.
2.
⊗
: A
⊗
B = D, where A, B, and D are (m×p), (p×n), (m×n)-dimensional
matrices respectively, such that dij = max1≤k≤p(aik · bkj).
3. ·∗ : A · ∗B = D, where A, B, and D are all m× n-dimensional matrices, such
that dij = aij · bij.
Similar to an ordinary Petri-nets, the execution rules of a FRPN include enabling
and firing rules.
1. A rule rj ∈ R is enabled if and only if pi is marked, or γi = 1, ∀pi ∈ {input
propositions of rj}.
2. Enabled at marking γ, rj firing results in a new γ
′
γ′(p) = γ(p)
⊕
O(p, rj), ∀p ∈ P .
The truth degree vector changes from θ to θ′
θ′(p) = θ(p)
⊕
cj · ρj ·O(p, rj), ∀pi ∈ P
where
ρj =
∑
pi∈r˙j xiwi
where
r˙j = {pi|I(pi, rj) = 1orH(pi, rj) = 1, pi ∈ P}
and
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xi = θi if I(pi, rj) = 1; xi = 1 − θi if H(pi, rj) = 1; wi is the weight of pi
regarding the rule rj.
3. All the enabled rules can fire at the same time. A firing vector µ is introduced
such that µj = 1 if rj fires. After firing a set of rules, the marking and truth
degree vectors of the FRPN become
γ′ = γ ⊕ [O ⊗ µ] (4.1)
θ′ = θ ⊕ [(O · C)⊗ ρ] (4.2)
where
ρ = [ρ1, ρ2, ..., ρm]
T , which is called control vector. µ : T −→ {0, 1} is the firing
vector. µ = (µ1, µ2, ..., µm)
T .
From Eq. 4.1 and Eq. 4.2, we notice that as long as µ and ρ are known, the next
step marking and truth degree vectors can be derived from the current values. To
obtain µ, an ‘neg’ operator is used. µk can be calculated as follows:
negγk = 1m − γk = γk
negθk = 1m − θk = θk
µk = (I +H)T ⊗ γk (4.3)
ρk = ((I
T . ∗W T ) · θk + (HT . ∗W T ) · θk) · ∗µk (4.4)
where
1m = (1, 1, ..., 1)
T , k is the kth reasoning step, neg θk is an n-dimensional vector. Its
components express the confidence of proposition pi being false at the kth reasoning
step, i = 1, 2, ..., n. γk is the marking. µk is an m-dimensional firing vector. µk = 1,
if rj is enabled, and µk = 0, if rj is not enabled, j = 1, 2, ...,m. W is the weight ma-
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trix. ρk is an m-dimensional control vector at the kth reasoning step. Its components
express the truth degrees of enabled rule rj’s preconditions. ρk = 0, if rule rj is not
enabled.
From Eq. 4.1 and Eq. 4.3:
γk+1 = γk ⊕ [O ⊗ (I +H)T ⊗ γk] (4.5)
From Eq. 4.2, Eq. 4.3 and Eq. 4.4:
θk+1 = θk ⊕ [(O · C)⊗ (((IT . ∗W T ) · θk + (HT . ∗W T ) · θk) · ∗µk)] (4.6)
To summarize, the FRPN algorithm can be described as follows:
1. Read initial inputs I,O,H,C,γ0, and θ0.
2. Let k = 0.
3. Compute γk+1 from γk according to Eq. 4.5; Compute θk+1 from θk according
to Eq. 4.6.
4. If θk+1 6= θk or γk+1 6= γk, let k = k + 1, and return to Step 3; Otherwise, the
reasoning is over.
2. Fault Section Estimation Model
We will focus on the fault section estimation problem on a 14-bus system as
shown in Fig. 13. The system consists of 34 sections, including 14 buses and 20
transmission lines. The buses are denoted as Bnn, where nn is a two-digit number
ranging from 01 to 14. The transmission lines are denoted as Lnnmm, where nn and
mm are the two-digit numbers of the two buses connected by the transition line and
nn is always smaller than mm. The protection system of the 14-bus system consists of
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174 protection devices, including 40 circuit breakers, 40 main transmission line relays,
40 primary backup transmission line relays and 40 secondary backup transmission line
relays and 14 bus relays. Only the 40 circuit breakers are shown in Fig. 13. They are
all installed on the two ends of the 20 transmission lines. The 40 circuit breakers are
denoted as CBnnmm, where nn is the two-digit number of the bus where the circuit
breaker is located and mm is the two-digit number of the bus at the remote end of
the transmission line. The 40 main transmission line relays are denoted MLRnnmm,
where nn is the two-digit number of the bus where the relay is located and mm is
the two-digit number of the bus at the remote end of the transmission line. The 40
primary backup transmission line relays are associated with the 40 main transmission
line relays respectively. They are denoted as BLRnnmm, where nn and mm have the
same meaning as those of the main relays. The 40 secondary backup transmission
line relays are associated with the 40 main transmission line relays respectively. They
are denoted as SLRnnmm, where nn and mm have the same meaning as those of
the main relays. The 14 bus relays are denoted as BRnn, where nn is the two-digit
number of the bus protected by the relay.
A bus relay protects its associated bus. It will operate to trip all the circuit
breakers connected to the bus if a fault occurs on the bus. A main transmission line
relay has forward protection zone and protects the whole transmission line. It will
operate to trip its associated circuit breaker to clear a fault on the transmission line.
A primary backup transmission line relay is the local backup of the main transmission
line relay and has the same protection zone as that of the main relay. If the fault
clearance by the main transmission line relay fails, the primary backup transmission
line relay will operate to trip its associated circuit breaker to clear the fault. A sec-
ondary backup transmission line relay is the remote backup of the main and primary
backup transmission line relays just beyond the remote end of the transmission line.
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Fig. 13. A 14-bus power system model
If the fault clearance by both the main and the primary backup transmission line
relays just beyond the remote end of the transmission line fails, it will operate to trip
its associated circuit breaker to clear the remote transmission line fault. A secondary
backup transmission line relay is also the remote backup of the bus relay at the remote
end of the transmission line. If the fault clearance by the bus relay at the remote end
of the transmission line fails, it will operate to trip its associated circuit breaker to
clear the remote bus fault.
For each section of the 14-bus system, a FRPN model will be built. The FRPN
model establishes the reasoning from the observed statuses of protection devices to a
faulted section based on the protection rules associated with the particular section.
There are two categories of models: 1) for transmission lines and 2) for buses. As
examples, the FRPN model for the transmission line L1314 is shown in Fig. 14 and
the FRPN model for the bus B13 is shown in Fig. 15.
In Fig. 14, the places p1, p2, ..., p12 represent the input propositions, which
are the operations of protection devices associated with the transmission line L1314.
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Fig. 14. A FRPN model for L1314 fault based on SCADA data
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Fig. 15. A FRPN model for B13 fault based on SCADA data
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For example, p5 represents the proposition “BLR1314 trips” and p6 represents the
proposition “CB1314 opens”. Initially all of these places contain a token, which
means that the truth degrees of these propositions are known. Each such proposition
will be assigned a truth degree value describing the certainty of observation of the
operation of the protection device. Under such an assumption, if the operation of
a protection device is actually observed, the proposition will have a truth degree
value θi which is bigger than 0. On the contrary, if the operation of the protection
device is not observed, the proposition will have a 0 truth degree value. θi can
be given by experience based on the reliability of the indication mechanism of the
protection device, the measurement channel for the protection device and the data
communication system for the protection device. In this example, θi will be given
the same value of 0.9.
The places p13, p14, ..., p22 represent the propositions which are intermediate
reasoning results. For example, p15 represents the proposition “main protection of the
transmission line L1314 at the bus B13 end operates for a fault on the transmission
line L1314”. p22 represents the proposition “protection of the transmission line L1314
at the bus B14 end operates for a fault on the transmission line L1314”. The place
p23 represents the output proposition “a fault exists on the transmission line L1314”.
The transitions r1, r2, ..., r15 represent rules in which antecedent propositions
implicate consequent propositions. Each rule rj is associated with a certainty factor
cj, which describes the confidence level of the rule. cj, j = 1, 2, ..., 7 can be given
by experience based on the reliability of relays. Usually a main relay has higher
reliability than that of a primary backup relay. A primary backup relay has higher
reliability than that of a second backup relay. In this example, c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, c7
will be given the values 0.7, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 0.9, 0.8, 0.7 respectively. cj, j = 8, 9, ..., 15
will be given the same value 1.0.
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It should be mentioned that from p6 to r1 and from p6 to r2, there are two
complementary arcs, which means that if the opening of the circuit breaker CB1314
is observed, the operation of the corresponding secondary backup protection should
be discredited. On the contrary, if the opening of the circuit breaker CB1314 is not
observed, the operation of the corresponding secondary backup protection should be
credited. Similarly, the complementary arc from p9 to r7 have the same meaning.
Regarding each rule, each of its antecedent propositions is given a weight, which
stands for the relative significance of the antecedent proposition in implicating the
consequent propositions. For example, regarding the rule r1, the proposition p1
“SLR0613 Trip” will be given a weight 0.4; the proposition p2 “CB0613 Trip” will be
given a weight 0.3; the absence of the proposition p6 “CB1314 Open” will be given a
weight 0.3.
According to the discussion in previous section, the matrical representation of
the FRPN model can be given as follows:
As an example, when a fault occurs on the transmission line L1314, its associ-
ated protection system operated to respond to the fault. The following signals are
observed in SCADA data: SLR0613 Trip, CB0613 Open, SLR1213 Trip, CB1213
Open, BLR1314 Trip, MLR1314 Trip, MLR1413 Trip and CB1413 Open. γ0 and θ0
are given as:
γ0 = [ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ]T
θ0 = [ 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ]T
The first reasoning step will result in
γ1 = [ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 ]T
θ1 = [ 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0 0 0.791 0.791 0.324 0.342 0.855 0.486 0.026
0 0 0 0 ]T
The second reasoning step will result in
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   1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
I
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  0  0  1  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  1  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1
O
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
H
         0.85 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
         0  0.85 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
         0  0  0.9   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
         0  0  0  0.95 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
         0  0  0  0  0.95 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
         0  0  0  0  0  0.9   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
         0  0  0  0  0  0  0.85 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
         0  0  0  0  0  0  0   1     0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
         0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0   1     0  0  0  0  0  0  
         0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0   1     0  0  0  0  0  
         0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0   1     0  0  0  0  
         0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0   1     0  0  0  
         0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0   1     0  0  
         0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0   1     0  
      0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0   1    
C
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  .4  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
  .3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0 .4  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0 .3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0 .4  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
  .3 .3 .6 .6  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0 .4  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0 .4  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0 .6 .6 .3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0 .4  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0 .4  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0 .3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0 .5  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0 .5  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 .5
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 .5
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
W =
γ2 = [ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 ]T
θ2 = [ 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0 0 0.791 0.791 0.324 0.342 0.855 0.486 0.026
0.791 0.342 0.855 0 ]T
The third reasoning step will result in
γ3 = [ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ]T
θ3 = [ 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0 0 0.791 0.791 0.324 0.342 0.855 0.486 0.026
0.791 0.791 0.855 0.599 ]T
The final reasoning step will result in
γ4 = [ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ]T
θ4 = [ 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0 0 0.791 0.791 0.324 0.342 0.855 0.486 0.026
0.791 0.791 0.855 0.823 ]T
So the conclusion will be that a fault occured on the transmission line L1314
with a truth degree value 0.823.
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In the same example as above, if MLR1413 Trip is missing in the SCADA data
due to data transmission error, the conclusion will be that a fault occured on the
transmission line L1314 with a truth degree value 0.652.
For each section of the 14-bus system, a FRPN model is built. So there are
totally 34 FRPN models. SCADA data are input into these models. The conclusion
of a fault occurrence on a section has a truth degree value. The conclusion with the
highest truth degree value is the final conclusion in case of single fault. In case of
multiple faults, the several conclusions with the highest truth degree values which are
greater than a threshold are the final conclusions.
3. Improvement Based on Digital Protective Relay Data
When a digital protective relay responds to a power system fault, a protection
operation chain will be formed to trip the circuit breaker to interrupt the fault cur-
rents. Along the chain, the fault is the initial cause, and the pickup and operation
of relay elements, the relay trip and the circuit breaker opening are the consequent
effects. In a fault section estimation problem, all the effects can be used to infer the
cause. We have discussed the use of relay trip signal and circuit breaker opening
status signal in SCADA data for fault section estimation. In this section we will
discusses the use of pickup and operation information of relay elements.
In a digital relay, the pickup and operation information of relay elements is usu-
ally in the form of logic operands. These logic operands are in essence digital bits and
are usually observed in two ways. First, they can be directly transmitted in the form
of register values via a digital communication system based on a certain communica-
tion protocol. Second, they are contained in relay files such as the event report and
the oscillography file and these files can be transmitted via a digital communication
system based on a certain file transfer protocol.
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The pickup and operation information of relay elements can be used to improve
the fault section estimation based on the relay trip signal and circuit breaker opening
status signal from SCADA data. The justification is as follows:
1. Along the protection operation chain, the pickup and operation of relay elements
are more directly related to the fault than the relay trip and circuit breaker
opening because the fault directly triggers the pickup and operation of relay
elements and the relay trip and the circuit breaker opening are further effects of
the pickup and operation of relay elements. The latter effects may be influenced
more by uncertain factors. For example, even if a relay element successfully
picks up and operates to respond to a fault, the relay trip contact may fail to
assert due to electrical or mechanical problems; the circuit breaker may also fail
to open due to electrical or mechanical problems. Obviously, it is desirable to
use information with less uncertainty.
2. In a multifunctional digital relay, several protection elements may pick up and
operate to respond to the same fault. For example, the neutral instantaneous
over-current element and the ground distance element may pick up and operate
to respond to a ground fault. Meanwhile, a logic operand representing the
pickup or operation of a protection element may exist in several relay files. In
case of communication errors which may generate false data, the redundancy
makes the relay pickup and operation information more reliable than the trip
signal and circuit breaker status signal measured by RTUs of SCADA systems.
3. A logic operand is originally in a digital form. If they are transmitted in the
form of register values or files through digital communication systems. They do
not need to be measured. On the contrary, the relay trip contact signal and the
circuit breaker status signal are originally analog signals. they are measured
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Fig. 16. A FRPN model for L1314 fault based on SCADA and digital protective relay
data
and converted to digital signals by RTUs of SCADA systems. Measurement
errors may exist, which may cause false data. Furthermore, the circuit breaker
status signal is generated by complex electrical and mechanical mechanism. A
problem in such a mechanism may also cause false indication of the circuit
breaker status.
Fig. 16 illustrates how the pickup and operation information is added into the
FRPN model built for diagnosing a fault on the transmission line L1314.
The matrical representation of the FRPN model described by Fig. 16 can be
easily generated based on the matrical representation of the FRPN model described
by Fig. 14. The following are the updated matrices I, O, H,W . There is no change on
matrix C. The weight assignment in W is adjusted to reflect the relative significance
of input signals in determination of the occurrence of a protection operation. The
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operation of relay element has the largest weight and the pickup of relay element has
the second largest weight. The relay trip and the circuit breaker opening have smaller
weights. When the absence of the circuit breaker opening for the main protection
and primary backup protection is taken into consideration of the secondary backup
protection, it has the largest weight.
We take the same example given in previous section. when a fault occurs on the
transmission line L1314, its associated protection system operated to respond to the
fault. In addition to the observed SCADA data, the following relay signals are also
observed: SLR0613 Pickup, SLR0613 Operation, SLR1213 Pickup, SLR1213 Opera-
tion, BLR1314 Pickup, BLR1314 Operation, MLR1314 Pickup, MLR1314 Operation,
MLR1413 Pickup, MLR1413 Operation, BLR1413 Pickup, SLR0914 Pickup. Since
the relay data are more reliable than the SCADA data, they are given a larger truth
value 0.98. γ0 and θ0 are given as:
γ0 = [ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ]T
θ0 = [ 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0 0.98 0 ]T
The final conclusion will be that a fault occurs on the transmission line L1314
with a truth degree value 0.848.
In the same example as above, if MLR1413 Trip is missing in the SCADA data
due to data transmission error while MLR1413 Pickup and MLR1413 Operation are
observed, the conclusion will be that a fault occurs on the transmission line L1314
with a truth degree value 0.827.
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   1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
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   0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
I =
  .05 0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
  .3   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
   0  .05 0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
   0  .3   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
   0   0  .05 0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
  .3  .3  .6  .6   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
   0   0   0  .05 0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
   0   0   0   0  .05 0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
   0   0   0   0  .6  .6  .3   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
   0   0   0   0   0  .05 0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
   0   0   0   0   0   0  .05 0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
   0   0   0   0   0   0  .3   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  .5   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  .5   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1   0   0   0   0   0   0
   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1   0   0   0   0   0
   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1   0   0   0   0
   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1   0   0   0
   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1   0   0
   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1   0
   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  .5
   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  .5
   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
  .15 0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
   .2  0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
   0 .15  0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
   0  .2   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
   0   0 .15  0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
   0   0  .2   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
   0   0   0 .15  0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0
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   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  1  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
O =
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
H=
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C. Summary
A Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-nets (FRPN) approach to solve the problem of fault
section estimation is discussed in this chapter. In this approach, the fuzzy reasoning
from protection system status data to faulted power system sections is formulated by
Petri-nets. The reasoning process can be graphically represented in a form of Petri-
nets and implemented by matrix operations. Data acquired by RTUs of SCADA
systems, including relay trip signals and circuit breaker status signals, are the inputs
to the diagnosis models. The logic operand data of digital protective relays such as
pickup and operation information of protection elements are more reliable than the
SCADA data to reflect relay trip status. They can be utilized as additional inputs to
the diagnosis models based on SCADA data and the required matrices representing
the new diagnosis models can be easily generated by augmenting and modifying the
original matrices.
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CHAPTER V
PROTECTION SYSTEM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Introduction
This chapter discusses a rule-based reasoning approach to solve the problem of
protection system performance evaluation. First, the overall structure of an auto-
mated protection system performance evaluation application which are based on the
Rule-based reasoning technique is described. Then each module of the application is
further detailed.
B. Rule-based Reasoning Approach
1. Overall Structure
The overall structure of the Automated Protection System Performance Evalu-
ation Application is represented in Fig. 17. The application consists of a relay file
retrieval module, a relay file data processing module, and a protection operation val-
idation and diagnosis module. The relay file retrieval module communicates to relays
to check if any new relay files are generated. If new relay files are generated, the
module will automatically download them to specified destinations. Then the relay
file data processing module processes incoming relay files so that relay data can be
converted into initial facts used by the protection operation validation and diagno-
sis module. The expert system based protection operation validation and diagnosis
module analyzes relay data to validate correct protection operations and diagnose
the reasons for unexpected protection operations. As a result, an analysis report is
generated to serve relevant users.
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Fig. 17. Functional structure of automated protection system performance evaluation
application
2. Automated Relay File Retrieval
Many digital relay vendors provide PC software programs which can commu-
nicate to their relays for relay settings, file retrieval, and real-time data view. For
example, GE has EnerVista UR Setup software for its UR series relays and SEL has
AcSELerator software for most of its relay series [14,15]. To retrieve relay files, users
need to manually run those software programs and initiate the file retrieval process.
This obviously renders difficulty in automated data retrieval and analysis. In order
to solve the problem, a relay file retrieval module is developed to automatically re-
trieve relay files upon their generation without user intervention, which makes the
automated data analysis possible.
Typically, digital relays support two modes of automated file retrieval mech-
anism, namely polling and report by exception. In the polling mode, a software
program initiates communication to a relay at certain time interval to check if there
are new files generated. If new files are identified, they will be downloaded by the
software program based on certain file transfer protocol. If there are no new files, the
communication will be halted till the next checking due time. The report by exception
mode means that upon the triggering of new event, a relay initiates communication
to notify a software program of the new event. Then the software program will down-
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load the new files based on certain file transfer protocol. Both of the two modes
have advantages and disadvantages. In a polling mode, since new files are checked
repeatedly at certain time interval, if a file transfer process fails due to certain error,
it is still possible to get those files in the next file transfer process. This makes the
risk of missing files small. In a report by exception mode, if the one-time new event
notification is not captured by the software program or the file transfer process fails
due to certain error, there is no remedy to get the new files. A polling mode occupies
more computer time than a report by exception mode because a polling mode repeats
check routines, while a report by exception mode just initiates communication upon
new event trigger. A polling mode also has slower response than a report by exception
mode. In a polling mode the file transfer process has to be initiated at scheduled due
time which may lag the new event trigger time, while in a report by exception mode
the file transfer process is initiated immediately after the new event trigger. Table III
summaries the advantages and disadvantages of the two modes.
The Automated Relay File Retrieval module is capable of automatically retriev-
ing files from GE’s UR series relays and SEL’s SEL421 relays. The module is embed-
ded in the application as a library. For each relay there is a master sub-module. A
configuration file is created to supply configuration information for those sub-modules.
Fig. 18 illustrates the functional structure.
Each relay master sub-module requires information about relay identification,
Table III. Comparison of digital relay file retrieval modes
Criteria Polling Report by Exception
Reliability Higher Lower
Computing Load More Less
Response Time Slower Faster
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communication port settings, file retrieval settings and last recorded event number.
The relay identification specifies relay ID and manufacturer information. The com-
munication port settings specify communication parameters such as communication
port number and baud rate. The file retrieval settings specify parameters related to
file transfer such as file retrieval mode and polling time interval. The last recorded
event number is compared with current event number in a relay to decide if a new
event is recorded by the relay. This number is updated when the file retrieval is done
for each new event.
GE UR series relays support Modicon Modbus RTU protocol over their RS232
or RS485 serial links. Appendix A details the UR relay file transfer mechanism and
gives the program flow chart for UR relay file retrieval in polling mode.
SEL421 relays support SEL ASCII Command protocol over their RS232 serial
links. Several SEL ASCII commands are involved in initiation of a file transfer from
the relay to external software. Once a file transfer is initiated, the Ymodem protocol
is used to perform the file transfer process. Appendix B details the SEL421 relay file
transfer mechanism and gives the program flow charts for SEL421 relay file retrieval
in polling mode and report by exception mode.
3. Relay File Data Processing
The relay file data processing module performs three functions. First, it parses
text information to extract performance specification data, setting data, fault data,
and event record data. Second, by applying Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT), it
extracts fundamental frequency phasors from analog oscillography data to determine
the exact fault inception time and fault clearance time, which are a portion of fault
data. Third, it determines the status changes of digital oscillography data and con-
verts them into event record data. Finally all the data are converted into CLIPS
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Fig. 18. Functional structure of automated relay file retrieval module
expert system fact format. Fig. 19 illustrates the functional structure.
Fig. 20 is the program flow diagram for calculation of fault inception and clear-
ance time. It is assumed that the phase current phasor amplitudes calculated at
the sample index number which is 5% of the total sample number are normal state
phase current phasor amplitudes. If any phase current phasor amplitude calculated
at certain sample index number is greater than 1.2 times of its corresponding normal
state phase current phasor amplitude, fault inception is detected and the fault in-
ception time is recorded. If all the phase current phasor amplitudes are smaller than
0.1 times of their corresponding normal state phase current phasor amplitudes, fault
clearance is detected and the fault clearance time is recorded. Fig. 21 is the program
flow diagram for determination of status changes of digital oscillography data.
4. Rule-based Reasoning
a. Problem Domain
For the evaluation of protection system performance, three levels of diagnosis
problems are involved. First, the expected statuses and timings of operation of el-
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Fig. 20 Continued
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ements should be simulated. Second, all the unexpected statuses and timings of
operation of elements should be identified. Third, a symptom of unexpected status
or timing of an element may be caused by a malfunction of its directly related logic
component. It may also be caused by a malfunction of unrelated logic components,
because abnormities can propagate through the protection operation chain to cause
several occurrences of symptoms. The malfunctioned logic components should be
traced out by analyzing the relations of these symptoms.
The first problem can be solved by building a protection operation logic model
which generates expected statuses and timings of elements. The second problem can
be solved by comparing the expected statuses and timings of elements with the actual
ones. To solve the third problem, an efficient way is to reason from the effect side to
the cause side in cause-effect relations. In terms of the protection operation chain,
a reasoning mechanism is needed to traverse from its higher level down to its lower
level.
The rule base built to solve the three levels of problems consists of three modules
called Expected Protection Operation Prediction, Protection Operation Validation
and Symptom Diagnosis respectively. Fig. 22 illustrates the conceptual strategy of
diagnosis reasoning. The expected protection operation is predicted by the Expected
Protection Operation Prediction Module. Inputs to the module are performance spec-
ification facts, relay setting facts and fault facts. Within this module, the expected
statuses and timings of active logic operands are inferred. The results are regarded
as hypothesis of protection operation. Event record facts obtained from the relay
file processing module are the actual statuses and timings of logic operands. With
both hypothesis and facts of protection operation as inputs, the Protection Operation
Validation Module performs validation of the correctness of statuses and timings of
logic operands based on hypothesis-fact matching. All the inconsistencies of expected
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Fig. 22. Conceptual strategy of reasoning
and actual statuses as well as timings of logic operands are regarded as symptoms.
The Symptom Diagnosis Module takes symptoms as inputs, trace the ultimate cause
of a symptom. An analysis report will be generated which contains the results from
all the three modules.
b. Expected Protection Operation Prediction
In order to predict the expected statuses and timings of elements, forward chain-
ing reasoning is employed to simulate the protection operation chain. Forward chain-
ing reasoning is also called bottom-up reasoning. It reasons from lower level facts to
top level conclusion. The protection operation chain fits into this concept. The distur-
bance information, relay settings and performance specifications are lower level facts.
Rules are written to simulate the transition of statuses of elements. The inferred
statuses and corresponding timings, combined with relay settings and performance
specifications are the inputs to the next transition. Thus, the whole protection op-
eration chain can be simulated until the final conclusion is reached, which reads as
“Fault currents are interrupted by the circuit breaker at time T”. Fig. 23 illustrates
the forward chaining reasoning for prediction of protection operation, which only
details the operation of a phase distance element.
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Fig. 23. Forward chaining reasoning for prediction of protection operation
c. Protection Operation Validation
Validation of Protection Operation is based on comparison of predicted statuses
and timings of elements with the actual ones. The status comparison is based on
the existence and non-existence of predicted status and actual status of an operand.
The predicted status is regarded as a hypothesis and the actual status is regarded
as a fact. If both the hypothesis and the fact exist, the correctness of the status is
validated. If the hypothesis exists and the fact does not exist or the hypothesis does
not exist but the fact exists, a symptom will be identified. Fig. 24 illustrates the
reasoning process for the lower three levels of the protection operation chain. The
reasoning process for other levels of the protection operation chain is similar. Fig.4
aims to deal with such symptoms: A status of a logic operand should have existed
but it does not exist. There is also a counterpart of the reasoning process, which aims
to deal with such symptoms: A status of a logic operand should have not existed but
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Fig. 24. Reasoning process for validation of status of logic operands
it exists.
The operating speed of protection elements and the associated circuit breaker is
evaluated by examining the timing of operands. Fig. 25 shows the logic for evaluating
the operating speed of protection elements. The logic for evaluating the operating
speed of the circuit breaker is similar.
d. Diagnosis of Symptoms
A symptom of unexpected status or timing may be caused by a malfunction of
its directly related logic component or by a malfunction of logic components at lower
level of protection operation chain due to the propagation of abnormality. Backward
chaining reasoning is employed to trace out the malfunctioned logic components.
Backward chaining reasoning is also called top-down reasoning. Along the reasoning
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Fig. 25. Logic reasoning for evaluating operating speed of protection elements
chain, in order to prove higher level hypotheses, the intermediate hypotheses must be
proven. Thus the reasoning will trace the basic facts to prove the hypotheses. This
mechanism is quite suitable for a diagnosis problem.
In the context of our problem domain, the backward reasoning chain is defined in
terms of a goal which can be accomplished by satisfying sub-goals. We use Fig. 26 and
Table IV to explain the reasoning process. Suppose the symptom “Circuit breaker
currents interruption failed” is identified, finding the reason for this symptom will be
set as the initial goal (Goal 1). Then the existence of the symptom “Circuit breaker
failed to open” will be tested. If it does not exist, it proves that the contact signal
indicated circuit breaker opening but in fact the circuit breaker did not interrupt
the fault currents. Obviously the diagnosis will be “Circuit breaker malfunctioned”.
But if the symptom “Circuit breaker failed to open” exists, it proves that the circuit
breaker failed to interrupt fault currents because the circuit breaker failed to open. A
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Fig. 26. Backward chaining reasoning for diagnosis of symptoms
sub-goal (Goal 2) will be created to find the reason for the symptom “Circuit breaker
failed to open”. Following this pattern, the second or more sub-goals will be created
and the malfunctioned logic components will be finally traced. It should be noticed
that because the relay trip can be triggered by the operation of any enabled protection
element, if the symptom “Relay failed to trip” is identified, sub-goals (Goal 4.1, Goal
4.2, ) for diagnosis of operation of each enabled element may be created at the same
time. Likewise, sub-goals (Goal 4.1.1, Goal 4.1.2, ) may be created for diagnosis of
operation of individual phase of an enabled protection element.
C. Summary
An automated protection system performance evaluation application which is
based on rule-based reasoning technique is presented in this chapter. The application
consists of a relay file retrieval module, a relay file data processing module, and a rule-
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Table IV. Explanation of backward reasoning process
Goal Description
Goal 1 To find the reason for the symptom “Fault currents inter-
ruption failed”
Goal 2 To find the reason for the symptom “Circuit breaker failed
to open”
Goal 3 To find the reason for the symptom “Relay failed to trip”
Goal 4.1 To find the reason for the symptom “Phase Distance Ele-
ment (Zone 1, Zone 2, ) failed to operate”
Goal 4.2 To find the reason for the symptom “Phase IOC Element
failed to operate”
Goal 4.1.1 To find the reason for the symptom “Phase A-B of Phase
Distance Element (Zone 1, Zone 2, ) failed to operate”
Goal 4.1.2 To find the reason for the symptom “Phase B-C of Phase
Distance Element (Zone 1, Zone 2, ) failed to operate”
Goal 4.1.1.1 To find the reason for the symptom “Phase A-B of Phase
Distance Element (Zone 1, Zone 2, ) failed to pickup”
Goal 4.1.1.2 To find the reason for the symptom “Over-current super-
vision of Phase A-B of Phase Distance Element (Zone 1,
Zone 2, ) failed”
Test Description
Test 1 Does the symptom “Circuit breaker failed to open” exist?
Test 2 Does the symptom “Relay failed to trip” exist?
Test 3 Does the symptom “All the protection elements expected
to operate failed to operate” exist?
Test 4.1 Does the symptom “All the phases of Phase Distance Ele-
ment (Zone 1, Zone 2, ) expected to operate failed to op-
erate” exist?
Test 4.1.1 Does the symptom “Phase A-B of Phase Distance Element
(Zone 1, Zone 2, ) failed to pickup” exist?
Test 4.1.1.1 Did the symptom “Over-current supervision of Phase A-B
of Phase Distance Element (Zone 1, Zone 2, ) failed” exist?
Diagnosis Description
Diagnosis 1 Circuit breaker malfunctioned
Diagnosis 2 Wire connection between the relay and the circuit breaker
is broken
Diagnosis 3 Logic component for Relay Trip malfunctioned
Diagnosis 4.1 Logic component for Operation of Phase Distance Element
(Zone 1, Zone 2, ) malfunctioned
Diagnosis 4.1.1 Logic component for Operation of Phase A-B of Phase Dis-
tance Element (Zone 1, Zone 2, ) malfunctioned
Diagnosis 4.1.1.1 Logic component for Pickup of Phase A-B of Phase Dis-
tance Element (Zone 1, Zone 2, ) malfunctioned
Diagnosis 4.1.1.2 Logic component for Over-current Supervision of Phase A-
B of Phase Distance Element (Zone 1, Zone 2, ) malfunc-
tioned
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based protection operation validation and diagnosis module. The relay file retrieval
module utilize file transfer mechanisms of digital protective relays to automatically
retrieve relay files. The data and information contained in these files are processed
and converted into proper format in the relay file data processing module. In the
rule-based protection operation validation and diagnosis module, forward chaining
reasoning is used for prediction of expected protection operation while backward
chaining reasoning is used for diagnosis of unexpected protection operations.
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CHAPTER VI
DEVELOPMENT OF POWER SYSTEM/PROTECTION SYSTEM
INTERACTIVE SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT
A. Introduction
This chapter discusses a “compiled foreign model” approach to solve the problem
of power system/protection system interactive simulation [56]. First, the “compiled
foreign model” mechanism of ATP MODELS language is introduced. Then a generic
digital protective relay model which is based on the “compiled foreign model” mecha-
nism is described. The programming structure which enables reuse of the generic relay
model is further presented. Finally the implementation of the generic relay model is
described with emphasis on the solution of the “seamless” interfacing between the
relay model and the power system model.
B. ATP Compiled Foreign Model Approach
1. Compiled Foreign Model of ATP MODELS Language
MODELS language is a general-purpose description language of the ATP pro-
gram [48, 49]. It provides a format which focuses on description of the structure of
a model, and the function of its elements. Compared with high-level programming
languages such as C/C++, its flexibility and programmability are relatively limited.
To overcome the disadvantage, MODELS provides a “compiled foreign model” mech-
anism to expand its flexibility and programmability. This mechanism can be utilized
for modeling a protective relay in high-level languages, and interfacing the relay model
with the power system model.
MODELS provides a pre-defined interface to link procedure called a “foreign
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model” which is written in other programming languages to the ATP simulation pro-
gram [49]. The interface is defined as four arrays carrying the values of data, input,
output and history variables. Each “foreign model” should provide both an execu-
tion procedure and an initiation procedure corresponding to the EXEC procedure and
INIT procedure of a model defined in MODELS. A “foreign model” must be compiled
and linked to the ATP simulation program before it can be called by MODELS. An
interface routine in a FORTRAN file called “formod.for” is where the user registers
the correspondence between the identification name used in the “foreign model” dec-
laration in MODELS, and the actual name of the procedure in the “foreign model”.
Once declared and named, a “foreign model” can be used independently in as many
separate uses as required. The inputs and outputs of the “foreign model”, along with
the directives controlling its simulation, are specified in a regular USE statement in
MODELS.
The newly developed ATP/MinGW program package has convenient tools to
compile a “foreign model” written in FORTRAN and C/C++, and link it with the
ATP simulation program [57]. The Minimalist GNU for Windows (MinGW) is a
compiler package for windows operating system [58]. In the ATP/MinGW program
package, the source code of the ATP program is compiled by the FORTRAN compiler
and C compiler to generate object files. The compilers are also used to compile the
user-supplied source code of a “foreign model” written in FORTRAN or C/C++ to
generate its object file. Then all the object files and libraries are linked together to
produce a new executable ATP program, which takes the ATP data case file as input
to run the simulation. Fig. 27 illustrates the whole make process which includes the
compilation and linking. It should be mentioned that the users can easily complete
the make process in dialogs in the ATP/MinGW program package.
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Fig. 27. Make process in the ATP/MinGW program package
2. Generic Digital Protective Relay Model
a. Main Features of a Generic Relay Model
Protective relays at different locations in a power system may have different
inputs, outputs, sampling rates and settings, but they usually have similar design
architectures. In order to efficiently realize the interaction between the power sys-
tem network model and each relay model associated with a specific location, our
strategy is to employ the “compiled foreign model” mechanism to build a generic
digital protective relay model as a “foreign model” and reuse the model with different
configuration of inputs, outputs, sampling rates and settings.
The generic relay model not only satisfies the common functional requirements
for components, interface, and protection functions, but also is capable of inserting
user-defined errors and generating event reports. Table V lists the main features of
the relay model.
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Table V. Main features of the generic relay model
Requirements Features
Components analog filter, A/D converter, implementation of protection
algorithms
Interface 15 channels of node voltages and branch currents inputs, 1
channel of trip signal output
Protection Functions phase distance, ground distance, differential
Others user-defined error insertion, setting file reading, generation
of event reports
b. Programming Structure of the Relay Model
By virtue of the “compiled foreign model” mechanism, the advanced features of
C++ language such as object-oriented concepts, direct access to windows libraries,
and powerful file I/O capability can be utilized to model the relay. It is possible to
realize all the functions of the relay model in the C++ “foreign model”. However,
since the MODELS language itself has some unique features which facilitate modeling
of some components of the relay, we adopt a hybrid approach to realize the relay
functions in both the MODELS section of ATP data case file and the C++ “foreign
model”. The interfacing to power system network model, analog signal filtering, and
the A/D conversion is implemented in the MODELS section, while all other functions
of the relay model are realized in the C++ “foreign model”. In order to reuse the
“foreign model” with different configuration of inputs, outputs and sampling rates
while applying the common analog signal filtering to all reused “foreign models”,
we employ an “inheritance” modeling architecture. A model named “RLY” which
represents a generic relay model is declared in the MODELS section. In the execution
procedure of “RLY”, the analog filtering function is defined, which is followed by the
definitions of use of “RLY” with different inputs, outputs and sampling rates. Fig. 28
illustrates the programming structure of the relay model.
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MODEL RLY FOREIGN FM {…} 
   INIT                          
   …
   ENDINIT
   EXEC                      
       ZFUN (y/x):=… 
       USE RLY AS RLY1                     
           TIMESTEP MIN: …                                                
           INPUT…                         
           OUTPUT…                         
       ENDUSE
       USE RLY AS RLY2
       . . .
   ENDEXEC 
extern “C” {
          …    --declare the initiation procedure 
and execution procedure  
}   
void relay_i_( double xdata_ar[],     
               double xin_ar[],
               double xout_ar[],
               double  xvar_ar[]);
{ …  --read relay setting file
}
void relay_m_( double xdata_ar[],   
               double xin_ar[],
               double xout_ar[],
               double  xvar_ar[]);
{ … --implement protection algorithms  
  … --generate relay reports  
}
MODELS section C++ “foreign model”
Functional blocks of a generic relay model
Fig. 28. Programming structure of the relay model
c. Implementation of the Relay Model
1. Interface to the Power System Network Model: The inputs from the power
system network model are three phase voltages measured at bus nodes and
three phase currents measured through circuit breaker switches. The outputs
of the power system network model are control variables of the control nodes of
circuit breaker switches. The names of these nodes and switches are declared
in the INPUT and OUTPUT directives of the MODELS section. In the USE
statement of each of the reused models, the inputs and outputs associated with
a specific relay location are defined by particular names of bus nodes, switches
and control nodes. A distance transmission line relay model has three phase
voltages and three phase currents as inputs. A differential bus relay has three
phase currents of each transmission line connecting to the bus bar as inputs.
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2. Analog Filtering: In order to meet the sampling theorem, the sampling rate
of the relay model should be twice the maximum frequency of the input ana-
log signals. Sampling with a lower sampling rate will result in errors due to
the aliasing effect in the frequency domain. The anti-aliasing filters, which in
practice are analog filters, should be used to minimize such aliasing effect as
well as attenuate the high frequency components. In the relay model, analog
second order Butterworth low-pass filter is employed. From a modeling point of
view, such a filter can be represented by the Z-plane digital transfer function,
which can be easily realized by the Z-transform transfer function of MODELS
language.
3. A/D conversion: The sample and hold circuit of A/D converters is realized
by the TIMESTEP MIN “time step” directive in the USE statement of the
generic relay model. This will actually perform the decimation in the original
simulation time step at the rate of the specified time step.
4. Protection Algorithms: All the protection algorithms are implemented as the
C++ “foreign model”. For a distance transmission line relay model, Fourier
Transform is used to extract the fundamental frequency phasors for phase volt-
ages and currents, line voltages and currents, and zero sequence currents. The
phasors for line voltages and currents are used to calculate the line impedances
for comparison with the MHO characteristic of the Phase Distance Elements.
The phasors for phase voltages and currents, and zero sequence currents are
used to calculate the phase impedances for comparison with the quadrilateral
characteristic of the Ground Distance Elements. For a differential bus relay
model, the instantaneous phase currents of each transmission line connecting to
the bus bar are summed to compare with a predefined threshold to detect the
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Table VI. User-defined error types of the relay model
Device Zone Status Error Type
Distance relay Zone 1, Zone 2 Pickup, operation, dropout, trip failure, data missing
Bus relay N/A Pickup, operation, dropout, trip failure, data missing
Circuit breaker N/A open failure, data missing
occurrence of a bus fault. For both types of relay models, timers are simulated
to ensure the required time coordination between the pickup and operation of
protection elements.
5. Relay File Generation: In the relay model, the digital signals representing
pickup and operation of protection elements are stored in the arrays. The
status changes of digital signals are detected and used for event report genera-
tion. At the end of the simulation, the file I/O functions of C++ are employed
to generate the time-stamped event reports.
6. Relay Setting Reading: In the initiation procedure, settings for all instantiated
relay models are read from a relay setting file by using the file I/O functions of
C++. Since the settings are not hard-coded, they can be easily changed from
case to case, which facilitates studies involving a large amount of cases.
7. Error Insertion: In the initiation procedure, code numbers for all kinds of user-
defined errors are read from an error code file by using the file I/O functions
of C++, which also facilitates easy setup of scenarios. The types of errors are
listed in Table VI.
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C. Summary
A “compiled foreign model” approach to the problem of power system/protection
system interactive simulation is discussed in this chapter. The “compiled foreign
model” mechanism of ATP MODELS language provides convenient method for mod-
eling a sophisticated digital protective relay using C++, interfacing the relay model
and the power system network model, and reusing such a relay model. The flexibility
of C++ language greatly facilitates the interfacing. Its file I/O capability is quite
useful for relay setting reading, relay file generation, and user-defined error insertion.
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CHAPTER VII
CASE STUDY
A. Introduction
This chapter presents the case study of the proposed Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-net
approach for fault section estimation and protection system performance evaluation
application. Test environment and scenarios are described. Test results are presented
and discussed.
B. Fault Section Estimation
1. Test Environment
The test environment used for the case study is the 14-bus system shown in
Fig. 13 in Chapter IV. Fig. 29 only shows its power system model created by an AT-
PDraw program. The whole power system/protection system interactive simulation
environment is developed by the approach described in Chapter VI.
2. Test Cases and Results
a. Case 1
The scenario of Case 1 is described in Table VII. The observed SCADA data are
listed in Table VIII. The observed relay data are listed in Table IX.
Based on the SCADA data in Table VIII, the only candidate for the fault section
is estimated as the transmission line L0910, with a truth degree value 0.855. Based on
both the SCADA data in Table VIII and relay data in Table IX, the only candidate
for the fault section is estimated as the transmission line L0910, with truth degree
value 0.882.
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Fig. 29. 14-bus power system model created by an ATPDraw program
Table VII. Scenario description of Case 1 for the fault section estimation study
Scenario Description
Power System Fault A permanent fault occurred on the transmission line L0910
at 0.05 second
Protection Device Failure No protection device failed
False Data No false data occurred
b. Case 2
The scenario of Case 2 is described in Table X. The observed SCADA data are
listed in Table XI. The observed relay data are listed in Table XII.
Based on the SCADA data in Table XI, the candidates for the fault section
are estimated and results are listed in Table XIII. Based on both the SCADA data
in Table XI and relay data in Table XII, the candidates for the fault section are
estimated and the results are listed in Table XIV.
c. Case 3
The scenario of Case 3 is described in Table XV. The observed SCADA data are
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Table VIII. SCADA data of Case 1 for the fault section estimation study
Sequence No. Time Stamp (Sec) Observed Signal
1 0.1000 MLR0910 TRIP
2 0.1000 MLR1009 TRIP
3 0.2000 CB0910 OPEN
4 0.2000 CB1009 OPEN
Table IX. Relay data of Case 1 for the fault section estimation study
Sequence No. Time Stamp (Sec) Observed Signal
1 0.0662 SLR0409 PKP
2 0.0677 SLR0709 PKP
3 0.0693 BLR0910 PKP
4 0.0698 MLR0910 PKP
5 0.0703 MLR1009 PKP
6 0.0703 BLR1009 PKP
7 0.0703 SLR1110 PKP
8 0.0724 SLR1409 PKP
9 0.0740 MLR0910 OP
10 0.0745 MLR1009 OP
listed in Table XVI. The observed relay data are listed in Table XVII.
Based on the SCADA data in Table XVI, the candidates for the fault section
are estimated and results are listed in Table XVIII. Based on both the SCADA data
in Table XVI and relay data in Table XVII, the candidates of the fault sections are
estimated and the results are listed in Table XIX.
Table X. Scenario description of Case 2 for the fault section estimation study
Scenario Description
Power System Fault A permanent fault occurred on the bus B04 at 0.05 second.
A second permanent fault occurred on the bus B09 at 0.09
second.
Protection Device Failure No protection device failed
False Data No false data occurred
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Table XI. SCADA data of Case 2 for the fault section estimation study
Sequence No. Time Stamp (Sec) Observed Signal
1 0.1000 BR04 TRIP
2 0.2000 CB0402 OPEN
3 0.2000 CB0403 OPEN
4 0.2000 CB0405 OPEN
5 0.2000 CB0407 OPEN
6 0.2000 CB0409 OPEN
7 0.2000 BR09 TRIP
8 0.2000 CB0904 OPEN
9 0.2000 CB0907 OPEN
10 0.2000 CB0910 OPEN
11 0.2000 CB0914 OPEN
Table XII. Relay data of Case 2 for the fault section estimation study
Sequence No. Time Stamp (Sec) Observed Signal
1 0.0537 BR04 PKP
2 0.0625 SLR0304 PKP
3 0.0651 SLR0904 PKP
4 0.0667 SLR0204 PKP
5 0.0667 SLR0504 PKP
6 0.0677 SLR0704 PKP
7 0.0703 BLR0704 PKP
8 0.0703 BLR0904 PKP
9 0.0766 BLR0204 PKP
10 0.0766 BLR0504 PKP
11 0.0771 BLR0304 PKP
12 0.0938 BR09 PKP
13 0.0964 SLR0709 PKP
14 0.1000 BR04 OP
15 0.1063 BLR0709 PKP
16 0.1115 SLR1009 PKP
17 0.1115 SLR1409 PKP
18 0.1115 SLR0409 PKP
19 0.1224 BLR1009 PKP
20 0.1224 BLR1409 PKP
21 0.1224 BLR0409 PKP
22 0.1401 BR09 OP
Table XIII. Candidates for estimated fault sections based on SCADA data of Case 2
Candidate No. Fault Section Truth Degree Value
1 B04 0.855
2 B09 0.855
3 L0409 0.513
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Table XIV. Candidates for estimated fault sections based on SCADA data and relay
data of Case 2
Candidate No. Fault Section Truth Degree Value
1 B04 0.882
2 B09 0.882
3 L0409 0.618
Table XV. Scenario description of Case 3 for the fault section estimation study
Scenario Description
Power System Fault A permanent fault occurred on the transmission line L1314
at 0.05 second; A second permanent fault occurred on the
bus B13 at 0.11 second.
Protection Device Failure The circuit breakers CB1312 and CB1306 failed to open
False Data The BR13 TRIP signal should be observed but it was not
observed.
Table XVI. SCADA data of Case 3 for the fault section estimation study
Sequence No. Time Stamp (Sec) Observed Signal
1 0.1000 MLR1314 TRIP
2 0.1000 MLR1413 TRIP
3 0.2000 CB1314 OPEN
4 0.2000 CB1413 OPEN
5 0.3000 BLR0613 TRIP
6 0.3000 BLR1213 TRIP
7 0.3000 CB0613 OPEN
8 0.3000 CB1213 OPEN
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Table XVII. Relay data of Case 3 for the fault section estimation study
Sequence No. Time Stamp (Sec) Observed Signal
1 0.0641 SLR1314 PKP
2 0.0651 SLR1413 PKP
3 0.0683 BLR1314 PKP
4 0.0688 BLR1413 PKP
5 0.0693 SLR0914 PKP
6 0.0698 MLR1314 PKP
7 0.0698 MLR1413 PKP
8 0.0703 SLR0613 PKP
9 0.0703 SLR1213 PKP
10 0.0740 MLR1314 OP
11 0.0740 MLR1413 OP
12 0.1141 BR13 PKP
13 0.1193 SLR0613 PKP
14 0.1204 SLR1213 PKP
15 0.1271 BLR0613 PKP
16 0.1297 BLR1213 PKP
17 0.1605 BR13 OP
18 0.2433 BLR0613 OP
19 0.2459 BLR1213 OP
Table XVIII. Candidates for estimated fault sections based on SCADA data of Case
3
Candidate No. Fault Section Truth Degree Value
1 L1314 0.855
2 B13 0.729
3 L1213 0.647
4 L0613 0.647
Table XIX. Candidates for estimated fault sections based on SCADA data and relay
data of Case 3
Candidate No. Fault Section Truth Degree Value
1 L1314 0.882
2 B13 0.854
3 L1213 0.722
4 L0613 0.722
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3. Discussion
As shown in Case 1, if the scenario is a single fault without protection device
failure and false data, the faulted section can be accurately identified. The truth
degree value of the result based on both the relay data and SCADA data are higher
than that based on only the SCADA data, because the relay data are assigned higher
truth degree values due to their higher reliability. Case 2 is more complex than Case
1, because multiple faults occur. As shown in Table XIII and Table XIV, besides
the bus B04 and the bus B09, on which faults actually occur, the transmission line
L0409, which has no fault, is included in the candidate set. The transmission line
L0409 has a far smaller truth degree value than the other two candidates, which
indicates small possibility of fault occurrence. Similar to Case 1, the truth degree
values of the candidates based on both the relay data and SCADA data are higher
than those based on only the SCADA data. Case 3 has additional complexity, because
not only multiple faults but also protection device failure and false data are involved.
As shown in Table XVIII and Table XIX, besides the transmission line L1314 and
bus B13, on which fault actually occur, the transmission line L1213 and transmission
line L0613, which have no fault, are included in the candidate set. The use of relay
data increases the truth degree values for all candidates. It should be noticed that
although the truth degree values of L1213 and L0613 are increased to some extent,
the truth degree value of B13 are largely increased. The actual faulted sections can
still be identified.
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C. Protection System Performance Evaluation
1. Test Environment and Relay Configuration
In a lab environment, Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories’ SEL421 and General
Electric’ D60 relays have been configured with the same settings as those of the two
relays protecting a 345 KV transmission line in a substation of CenterPoint Energy,
Houston. A digital simulator is used to generate the voltage and current inputs to
the two relays. It also simulates the breaker status signals which are monitored by
the two relays.
In the substation, the 345 KV transmission line of interest with a length of
31.5 miles is protected by a SEL421 relay and a D60 relay. The SEL421 relay acts as
main protection which implements a Directional Comparison Blocking scheme (DCB).
The D60 performs backup protection which implements distance and over current
protection. The trip contacts are combined together to trip the circuit breakers F280
and F290.
The principle of DCB scheme is described in Fig. 30. Line RS is protected by
protection elements located at Terminal R and Terminal S. The directional fault
detection elements at Terminal R and Terminal S, designated as FD(R) and FD(S)
respectively, are set to overreach the remote terminals so that they will pick up for
all internal faults on Line RS. Usually they are set to overreach by 120-150% of the
line length. Starting elements, designated as ST(R) and ST(S), are set with different
reach than the fault detection elements. ST(R) and ST(S) can be directional or non-
directional. If they are directional, ST(R) will only pick up for external faults to the
left of Terminal S and within its reach. Similarly, ST(S) will only pick up for external
faults to the right of Terminal S and within its reach. If ST(R) and ST(S) are non-
directional, they will pick up for both internal and external faults within their reach. If
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Fig. 30. Principle of DCB scheme
ST(R) and ST(S) pick up, they will key the communication equipment on to transmit
the blocking signal to the fault detection element at the remote terminal. Non-
directional starting elements do not process a directional decision, so non-directional
starting elements are always faster than directional starting elements.
If an internal fault occurs, FD(R) will pick up at Terminal R. The pickup of
FD(R) will also key its associated communication equipment off to prevent sending
the blocking signal in case of the pickup of ST(R). Similarly, at Terminal S, FD(S) will
pick up and operate. The pickup of FD(S) will also key its associated communication
equipment off to prevent sending the blocking signal in case of the pickup of ST(S).
Consequently, there is no blocking signal sent in either direction, and Circuit Breaker
C and D will trip to open and clear the fault.
If an external fault to the left of Terminal R occurs, FD(R) will not pick up.
But FD(S) will pick up if the fault is within its reach. ST(R) will pick up to key its
associated communication equipment on to send the blocking signal to the remote
FD(S). Thus the tripping of Circuit Breaker D by FD(S) will be blocked. If an
external fault to the right of Terminal S occurs, the tripping of Circuit Breaker C by
FD(R) will be blocked in a similar manner.
According to the SEL421 relay configuration, Phase Distance Zone 2 Element
M2P and Neutral Directional Over-current Level 2 Element 67G2 are configured as
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Fig. 31. SEL421 operation logic
phase and ground fault detection elements. Phase Distance Zone 3 Element M3P
and Neutral Directional Over-current Level 3 Element 67G3 are configured as direc-
tional starting elements. Neutral Non-directional Over-current Level 3 Element 50G3
is configured as a non-directional starting element. Fig. 31 describes the operation
logic. As shown in Fig. 31, the operation of M2P or 67G2 may trigger the relay to
trip if the blocking signal is not received. The pickup of directional starting elements
M3P or 67G3 will directly key the communication equipment on to send the block-
ing signal and can not be stopped by fault detection elements. While directional
starting elements have priority over fault detection elements, fault detection elements
have priority over non-directional starting elements. That is to say, the operation
of fault detection elements will prevent non-directional starting elements to key the
communication equipment on to send the blocking signal. Besides logic issues, some
important timing issues need to be carefully considered.
Timers 21SD and 67SD are used to set the carrier coordination time delay for
M2P and 67G2 respectively. The delay should allow the blocking signal from the
remote relay to arrive before the local circuit breaker trips for external faults behind
the remote terminal. The setting for the timers is a sum of the following three time
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Fig. 32. D60 operation logic
intervals: the maximum pickup time of the remote starting elements, the maximum
communication channel operating time, the contact input recognition time of the
local relay.
Timer BTXD is used to set the delay of dropout of the contact input assigned
to logic operand BT (Blocking Signal Received). This input must remain asserted to
block fault detection elements from triggering the relay trip after the carrier coordi-
nation timers expire. If the blocking signal drops out momentarily, fault detection
elements can trigger the relay trip for external faults behind the remote terminal.
The delay by the timer helps avoid unexpected trip during momentary lapses of the
blocking signal (carrier holes).
According to the D60 relay configuration, Phase Distance Zone 1 Element and
Phase Distance Zone 2 Element are configured to look at phase faults in the for-
ward direction. Neutral Instantaneous Over-current Element is configured to look
at ground faults. Since the Neutral Instantaneous Over-current Element is non-
directional, the Reverse Directional Negative Sequence Over-current Element is used
to block the Neutral Instantaneous Over-current Element from operating for reverse
ground faults. Fig. 32 describes the D60 operation logic.
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2. Test Cases and Results
a. Case 1
The scenario of Case 1 is described in Table XX. Fig. 33 is the analysis report
generated by the protection system performance evaluation application.
b. Case 2
The scenario of Case 2 is described in Table XXI. Fig. 34 is the analysis report
generated by the protection system performance evaluation application.
c. Case 3
The scenario of Case 3 is described in Table XXII. Fig. 35 is the analysis report
generated by the protection system performance evaluation application.
3. Discussion
The scenario of Case 1 assumes that no malfunction or error happens in the
protection system and hence it represents a normal situation. As shown in Fig. 33,
the analysis report shows that all the input and output contacts, and protection
elements of both the D60 relay and SEL421 relay are operated as expected. In Case
2, the opening of a circuit breaker is assumed to be 1 cycle slower. As shown in Fig. 34,
the analysis report reveals that the slower circuit breaker opening is identified based
on either D60 relay data or SEL421 data. In Case 3, the pickup settings of phase
distance elements of the SEl421 relay are assumed to be incorrect, which makes the
relay fail to issue trip signals, while the D60 relay works correctly to trip the circuit
breakers. As shown in Fig. 35, the analysis report tells that the pickup of phase
distance elements and the assert of relay trip signals of SEl421 relay have failed. The
reason is incorrect pickup settings of the phase distance element.
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Table XX. Scenario of Case 1 for the protection system performance evaluation study
Fault Type Permanent AB fault
Fault Location 50 % (15.75 miles)
Device Mulfunction/Error None
Description The main and backup relays tripped circuit breakers to
clear the fault as expected.
Fig. 33. Analysis report of Case 1 for the protection system performance evaluation
study
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Table XXI. Scenario of Case 2 for the protection system performance evaluation study
Fault Type Permanent AG fault
Fault Location 40 % (12.60 miles)
Device Mulfunction/Error Opening of the middle circuit breaker F280 is delayed for
1 cycle.
Description The main and backup relays tripped circuit breakers to
clear the fault. The fault clearance is delayed due to slow
opening of the middle circuit breaker F280.
Fig. 34. Analysis report of Case 2 of the protection system performance evaluation
study
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Table XXII. Scenario of Case 3 for the protection system performance evaluation study
Fault Type Permanent AB fault
Fault Location 50 % (15.75 miles)
Device Malfunction/Error The pickup settings of Phase Distance Zone 1 Element,
Phase Distance Zone 2 Element and Phase Distance Zone
4 Element of the main relay are not correct.
Description The main relay failed to trip circuit breakers due to incor-
rect settings. The backup relay tripped the circuit breakers
to clear the fault.
Fig. 35. Analysis report of Case 3 for the protection system performance evaluation
study
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D. Summary
Case study of the proposed FRPN approach for fault section estimation and
protection system performance evaluation application is presented in this chapter.
Experiential tests have shown that the proposed FRPN approach for fault section
estimation is able to perform accurate fault section estimation under complex scenar-
ios. It was also shown that the developed protection system performance evaluation
application has successfully performed relay performance analysis.
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CHAPTER VIII
IMPLEMENTATION SOLUTIONS
A. Introduction
This chapter proposes implementation solutions for the problems of fault section
estimation, protection system performance evaluation, and power system/protection
system interactive simulation. First, a fault section estimation application imple-
mented in a control center and its SCADA system support infrastructure are pre-
sented. Then a protection system performance evaluation application implemented
in a substation is illustrated and some prototype software development is demon-
strated. Finally the process of power system/protection system interactive simulation
is described and a GUI prototype for the setting program is demonstrated.
B. Implementation Solutions
1. Fault Section Estimation
The fault section estimation application will be implemented in a control center
to assist the system operator in rapidly identifying faulted sections for restoration
process. The structure of the application as well as its SCADA support infrastructure
are illustrated in Fig. 36.
In such a solution, input data such as relay trip signals and circuit breaker
status signals are acquired by RTUs of the SCADA system. Relay logic operand
signals are defined in their data memories and retrieved from relays by the SCADA
front-end computers in substations. The data are acquired from different substations
and are transmitted to the control center through selected communication link such
as microwave or optical fiber. In the control center, the SCADA master computer
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Fig. 36. Implementation of fault section estimation application
puts the input data into a real-time data base and keeps updating them at each scan
time.
The fault section estimation application includes two stage analysis. In the first
stage, the system topology is analyzed based on circuit breaker status data in the
real-time data base. The analysis will include all sections isolated by the opening of
circuit breakers into a rough candidate set. The set is rough because it more likely
includes sections which are not faulted but are isolated due to backup relay operation.
In the second stage analysis, the Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-net diagnosis model as well as
data in the real-time data base corresponding to each section in the rough candidate
set are used and Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-net matrix operation is implemented. As a
result, each section will be associated with a truth degree value. The section with
a truth degree value greater than a certain threshold will be included in the refined
candidate set. Such a refined candidate set is presented to the system operator for
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decision-making.
In such a solution, the FRPNmodels which are represented by all kind of matrices
are separated from FRPN matrix operations. This is analogous to an expert system
whose rule-base is separated from its inference engine. The FRPN models can be
built in advance based on power system and protection system configurations and
stored in files. In such a way, the FRPN models can be easily modified according to
the change of power system and protection system configuration.
2. Protection System Performance Evaluation
The Protection System Performance Evaluation Application will be implemented
in a substation in assisting protection engineers to assess protection system perfor-
mance in the post-fault analysis. Fig. 37 shows the implementation structure.
In such a solution, an automated relay file retrieval module communicates to
relays through serial communication links according to communication port settings
and file retrieval settings. It monitors new relay files triggered by the operations of
relays and downloads them into specified file repository. Fig. 38 shows a GUI for the
automated relay file retrieval module.
A file data processing module monitors the incoming file repository, processes file
data and converts them into initial facts of CLIPS expert system. Another category of
initial facts is performance specification data which are input from GUI by protection
engineers. Fig. 39 shows a GUI for the performance specification input.
In our solution, the inference engine of CLIPS expert system is complied as a
Dynamic Link Library (DLL) and embedded in the application. The API functions
for the DLL are used as bridges for initial facts, rule-base and inference engine. The
rule-base is created by protection engineers and stored in a text file.
The final analysis report generated is displayed in the GUI and also stored into a
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Fig. 38. GUI of automated relay file retrieval module
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Fig. 39. GUI of protection system performance evaluation application
report repository. The analysis report can be utilized by other applications to perform
more comprehensive analysis.
3. Power System/Protection System Interactive Simulation
In the procedure of power system/protection system interactive simulation, the
user will fist prepare the ADP file which models the power system, the MODELS
data case which specifies the interface between the power system model and the
protection system model, and the C++ source code which models the protection
system. Then an ATPDraw program, an ATP/MinGW program, and a simulation
setting program will be utilized in the process [57,59]. Fig. 40 illustrates the structure
of the implementation.
The ADP file is graphically created in the ATPDraw program. The user can
build a power system model by adding in all kinds of power system components.
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The model can be built in a hierarchical way in that a group of components can be
represented by a user-created icon. It should be mentioned that the models of circuit
breakers, current transformers (CT) and voltage transformers (VT) which belong to
protection systems are included in the ADP file. Fig. 29 in Chapter VII is an example
of an ADP file.
By using the ATPDraw program, the ADP file can be converted to an ATP data
case file. Then an MODELS data case is inserted into the ATP data case file to add
the interface between the power system model and the protection system model. The
augmented file is called a template ATP data case file.
A simulation setting program is used to modify the template ATP data case file
in order to specify the simulation parameters such as the total simulation time and the
length of simulation time step, and the fault parameters such as fault section, fault
type, fault location and fault inception time. The program is also utilized to specify
protection system settings and user-defined errors. As the outcome, a modified ATP
data case file, a protection system setting file and a protection system error code file
are created. Fig. 41 shows the GUI of the simulation setting program.
The C++ source code file which models the protection system is compiled as an
object and linked with the original ATP object and some libraries by the ATP/MinGW
program. As the outcome, an executable ATP program will be created. Such a pro-
gram takes the modified ATP data case file, the protection system setting file and the
protection system error code file as inputs, performs the simulation, and generates the
ATP PL4 file which stores the power system measurement data and the protection
system event report which reveals the protection system behavior.
103
ADP file
(power system 
model)
ATPDraw 
program
C++ source 
code file
(protection 
system  model)
ATP/MinGW 
program
MODELS
 data case 
(foreign model 
interface)
Template ATP 
data case file
Protection 
system
setting file
Protection 
system error 
code fileSimulation 
setting
program
Modified ATP 
data case file
(fault inserted)
Executable  
program
ATP PL4 file
(power system 
data) 
Protection 
system event 
reports
Fig. 40. Implementation of power system/protection system interactive simulation
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C. Summary
The implementation solutions for the problems of fault section estimation, protec-
tion system performance evaluation, and power system/protection system interactive
simulation are proposed in this chapter. In the fault section estimation application,
two-stage analysis is proposed for implementation. In the first stage, a system topol-
ogy analysis results in a rough fault section candidate set and in the second stage,
FRPN models and matrix operations are implemented to refine the candidate set.
In the protection system performance evaluation application, an automated relay file
retrieval module and a relay file data processing module are implemented to get the
initial facts. An inference engine of CLIPS expert system is compiled as a DLL to
perform the reasoning based on initial facts and rules. The results are displayed in
user interface and stored in file repository. In the process of power system/protection
system interactive simulation, the ADP file which models the power system, the
MODELS data case which specifies the interface between the power system model
and the protection system model, and the C++ source code which models the protec-
tion system need to be prepared. Then ATPDraw program, ATP/MinGW program,
and simulation setting program will be utilized in the process. The results are the
ATP PL4 file and the protection system event report.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS
A. Expected Benefits
This dissertation has focused on three fundamental problems in power system
fault analysis, namely fault section estimation, protection system performance eval-
uation, and power system/protection system interactive simulation. Although there
are existing solutions to these problems, new approaches proposed in the disserta-
tion have their unique strength in solving these problems and have demonstrate their
advantages. The expected benefits to be gained from the proposed approaches are
summarized as follows:
1. The Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-nets technique has combined strength of uncertainty
processing, rule-based reasoning, symbolic representation, and parallel comput-
ing. It makes fault section estimation more accurate, fast and adaptive to
system changes. Especially, the reasoning process can be visualized in a form of
graphical representation of Petri-nets. The rule base and parameters are saved
in matrix forms and the whole reasoning process is implemented by matrix op-
erations. This will significantly facilitates the procedure of rule base building
and maintenance. It will provide system operators a fast and reliable tool for
identifying fault sections in the restorative stage.
2. IED Data are more reliable than SCADA data. The proposed approach to
combine IED data and SCADA data will further enhance the accuracy of fault
section estimation.
3. The developed protection system performance evaluation application stream-
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lines the process of assessing the protection system operations. It automates
acquisition of data, validation of protection system operations and diagnosis of
unexpected operations, which are previously done manually by protection en-
gineers in the post-fault analysis. This allows fast and reliable assessment of a
large number of protection system operations.
4. The “compiled foreign model” approach of power system/protection system in-
teractive simulation allows modeling of sophisticated protection systems in an
“object-oriented“ way as well as building a “seamless” interface between power
system models and protection system models. It will provide a convenient ex-
perimental platform for various research activities related to protection systems
and power system fault analysis.
B. Research Contribution
Power system fault analysis provides critical information to utility staff to be able
to understand the reasons for power system interruption better and provide action to
restore the power delivery quicker. Three fundamental problems in power system fault
analysis, namely fault section estimation, protection system performance evaluation,
and power system/protection system interactive simulation have been researched.
Although there are existing solutions to these problems, the dissertation study has
made new contributions to these areas.
A Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-nets (FRPN) approach to solve the problem of fault
section estimation is discussed in Chapter IV. In this approach, the fuzzy reasoning
from protection system status data to faulted power system sections is formulated by
Petri-nets. The reasoning process can be graphically represented in a form of Petri-
nets and implemented by matrix operations. Data acquired by RTUs of SCADA
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systems are the inputs to the diagnosis models. The logic operand data of digital
protective relays, which are more reliable than the SCADA data, are utilized as
additional inputs. The matrix formalism of implementing Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-net
based fault section estimation is not reported in existing literature and the concept
of utilizing IED data for fault section estimation is new in this area.
An automated protection system performance evaluation application which is
based on rule-based reasoning technique is presented in Chapter V. The application
consists of a relay file retrieval module, a relay file data processing module, and
a rule-based protection operation validation and diagnosis module. The relay file
retrieval module utilizes file transfer mechanisms of digital protective relays to auto-
matically retrieve relay files. The data and information contained in these files are
processed and converted into proper format in the relay file data processing mod-
ule. In the rule-based protection operation validation and diagnosis module, forward
chaining reasoning is used for predicting expected protection operations while back-
ward chaining reasoning is used for diagnosing unexpected protection operations.
Such a completely automated application is rather new in the power system industry.
A “compiled foreign model” approach to the problem of power system/protection
system interactive simulation is detailed in Chapter VI. This approach enables mod-
eling of a sophisticated digital protective relay using C++, and “seamless” interfacing
of the relay model and power system network model. The resulting digital relay model
can be reused and has capability of reading settings , generating event reports, and
inserting user-defined errors. As an outcome, the power system/protection system
interactive simulation environment is more convenient and powerful than existing
solutions.
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C. Suggestion for Future Work
Although significant achievements have been made in the dissertation study, due
to limitation of time, many research topics still remain to be explored. Some further
work is suggested as follows:
1. For the Fuzzy Reasoning Petri-nets based fault section estimation, timing infor-
mation of the logic operands of digital relays can be utilized to further improve
the estimation accuracy. Sparse matrices largely exist in Petri-nets representa-
tion of fault section diagnosis models. Techniques for processing sparse matrices
can be utilized to improve efficiency of memory usage and computation.
2. The automated protection system performance evaluation application mainly
uses relay file data as inputs. It can be integrated with other analysis applica-
tions such as DFR data analysis application and circuit breaker monitor data
analysis application to achieve more accurate and comprehensive analysis.
3. MATLAB and some other intelligent system shells provide run-time access rou-
tine for C/C++ language. In the “compiled foreign model“ based power sys-
tem/protection system interactive simulation, the digital relay model can be
improved to utilize the functions in the MATLAB and the intelligent system
shells such as an expert system shell. Thus an improved platform to study
intelligent system application to analysis of protection system operation based
on interactive simulation can be implemented.
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APPENDIX A
GE UR SERIES RELAY FILE TRANSFER MECHANISM
GE UR series relays support Modicon Modbus RTU protocol over their RS232
or RS485 serial links. A UR relay always acts as a slave device, which only listens and
responds to requests issued by a master computer. Communications takes place in
packets which are groups of asynchronously framed byte data. The master transmits
a packet to the slave and the slave responds with a packet. The end of a packet is
marked by “dead-time” on the communications line. Table XXIII describes general
format of both transmit and receive packets.
Modbus officially defines function codes from 1 to 127. Only two are used by UR
relays for file transfer. Table XXIV summarizes these two function codes.
The UR relays have a generic file transfer facility, meaning that users can use
the same method to obtain all of the different types of files such as oscillography
file, event report and fault report. The Modbus registers that implement file transfer
are found in the “Modbus File Transfer (Read/Write)” module, starting at address
0x3100 and “Modbus File Transfer (Read Only)” module, starting at address 0x3200.
They are listed in Table XXV. The following steps are used to read a file from a UR
relay:
1. Write the filename to the “Name of file to read” register in “Modbus File Trans-
fer (Read/Write)” module using a write multiple registers command. The file
name format of different file types is listed in Table XXVI.
2. Repeatedly read all the registers in “Modbus File Transfer (Read Only)” module
using a read multiple registers command. The “Character position of current
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Table XXIII. Modbus RTU packet format
Frame Name Size Description
Slave Address 1 byte Each slave on a communication bus must have a
unique address which is programmable from 1 to
254. A master transmit packet with slave address
0 indicates a broadcast command
Function Code 1 byte This tells the slave what action to perform.
Data N bytes This includes a variable number of bytes depend-
ing on the function code. This may include actual
values, settings, or addresses sent by the master
to the slave or by the slave to the master.
CRC 2 bytes This is an error checking code generated by a 16-
bit cyclic redundancy check algorithm (CRC-16).
Dead Time 3.5 bytes transmission time A packet is terminated when no data is received
for a period of 3.5 byte transmission time. The
transmitting device must not allow gaps between
bytes longer than this interval.
block within file” register is initially zero and thereafter indicates how many
bytes have been read so far. The “Size of currently-available data block” register
indicates the number of bytes of data remaining to read, to a maximum of 244.
The “Block of data” registers contain file data. The entire block behaves like
a stack, which is updated by next block of file data after each reading of the
current one.
3. If a block of file data needs to be re-read, only the “Size of currently-available
data block” and “Block of data” registers should be read. The file pointer is
only incremented when the “Character position of current block within file”
register is read, so the same block of file data will be returned as was read in
the previous operation.
4. Keep reading until the “Size of currently-available data block” register is smaller
than 244, the number of bytes of data read from data block each time. This
condition indicates end of file.
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Table XXIV. Modbus RTU function codes for file transfer
Function Code GE Relay Definition Description
0x04 Read actual values or settings This function code allows the master to read one
or more consecutive data registers (actual values
or settings) from a UR relay.
0x10 Write multiple settings This function code allows the master to modify
the contents of a one or more consecutive setting
registers in a UR relay.
Table XXV. UR relay registers used for file transfer
Address Name
0x3000 Oscillography number of triggers
0x3100 to 0x3127 Name of file to read (40 registers)
0x3200 Character position of current block within file
0x3202 Size of currently-available data block
0x3203 to 0x327C Block of data (122 registers)
Table XXVI. UR relay file name format
File Type Format
COMTRADE Oscillography File OSCnnn.HDR, OSCnnn.CFG, OSCnnn.DAT (Replace nnn
with the desired oscillography trigger number)
Event Report EVTnnn.TXT (Replace nnn with the desired starting
record number)
Fault Report faultReportnnn.TXT (Replace nnn with the desired fault
report number)
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If only the files corresponding to the latest event are retrieved, the current event
number recorded by the relay must be known. This can be done by reading the
“Oscillography number of triggers” at address 0x3000.
Fig. 42 is the program flow chart for UR relay file retrieval in polling mode.
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Fig. 42. Program flow chart for UR relay file retrieval in polling mode
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APPENDIX B
SEL421 RELAY FILE TRANSFER MECHANISM
SEL421 relays support SEL ASCII Command protocol over their RS232 serial
links. Several SEL ASCII commands are involved in initiation of a file transfer from
the relay to external software. Table XXVII describes these commands and their
functions regarding to initiation of a file transfer. The file name format of different
file types is listed in Table XXVIII.
If only the files corresponding to the latest event are retrieved, the current event
number recorded by the relay can be determined from the summary report responding
to the “SUM” command at each polling time in the polling mode of file retrieval. The
summary report can also be automatically sent by the relay to a serial port after a
new event occurs if the auto-message function is enabled for the serial port. This
function can be used for the report by exception mode of file retrieval.
Once a file transfer is initiated by the “FILE READ EVENTS filename” com-
mand, the Ymodem protocol is used to perform the file transfer process. The Ymodem
protocol is a receiver driven, asynchronous, 8 data bit protocol. When the receiver
sends a byte for initiation, positive acknowledgment or negative acknowledgment,
the sender responds with a packet which is a group of byte data. In the SEL421 file
transfer process, the receiver refers to the ARFR program and the sender refers to the
SEL421 relay. The bytes sent by a receiver are described in Table XXIX. Table XXX
describes general format of a sender packet.
The following steps describe a file transfer process:
1. The receiver first sends a “C” byte to initiate a file transfer. The sender responds
with an information packet which contains the file name.
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Table XXVII. SEL ASCII COMMANDS for initiation of file transfer
Command Description
ACC Go to Access Level 1, which is a monitoring level
SUM Return the most recent event summary in order
to get the current event number
FILE READ EVENTS filename Initiate a file transfer
Table XXVIII. SEL421 file name format
File Type Format
COMTRADE Oscillography File HR nnnnn.HDR, HR nnnnn.CFG,
HR nnnnn.DAT (Replace nnnnn with the
desired event number)
Compressed 8 Sample/Cycle Event Report C8 nnnnn.TXT (Replace nnnnn with the desired
event number)
Compressed 4 Sample/Cycle Event Report C4 nnnnn.TXT (Replace nnnnn with the desired
event number)
Table XXIX. Ymodem receiver bytes
Symbol Value Description
C 0x43 Character “C”
ACK 0x06 Positive acknowledgment
NAK 0x15 Negative acknowledgment
Table XXX. Ymodem sender packet format
Frame Name Size Description
Head 1 byte SOH (0x01) indicates a 128 bytes data frame
length; STX(0x02) indicates a 1024 bytes data
frame length; EOT (0x04) indicates the end of
transmission. No other frames follow EOT.
Packet Number 1 byte 0x00 indicates an information packet, which con-
tains file name in the data frame; 0x01 to 0xFF
indicates a file data packet. The number starts
at 0x01, increments by 1 and wraps from 0xFF
to 0x01.
Packet Number Complement 1 byte 0xFF minus the packet number
Data 128 bytes or 1024 bytes File name data or file data
CRC 2 bytes This is an error checking code generated by a 16-
bit cyclic redundancy check algorithm (CRC-16)
for the data frame.
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2. After the filename has been transmitted, the receiver asks for file data by sending
another “C”. The sender responds by sending a data packet. If the receiver
receives the packet and decides the received data are correct by checking the
CRC code, it sends back an ACK. If the receiver does not received the packet
in a certain time limit or decides the received data are not correct, it sends back
a NAK. If the sender receives an ACK in a certain time limit, it sends the next
data packet. If the sender does not receive an ACK in a certain time limit or
receives a NAK, it re-sends the data packet. This process continues until the
sender sends an EOT to indicate the end of transmission of file data.
3. After the file has been transmitted, the receiver asks for the next file by sending
a “C”. Transmission of an information packet with null filename by the sender
indicates termination of the entire file transfer process.
Fig. 43 and Fig. 44 are the program flow charts for SEL421 relay file retrieval in
polling mode and report by exception mode respectively.
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Fig. 43. Program flow chart for SEL421 relay file retrieval in polling mode
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Fig. 44. Program flow chart for SEL421 relay file retrieval in report by exception mode
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